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Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) includes the methods and processes used by 
organizations to manage risks and seize opportunities that maximize firm performance. 
Thus, the ERM framework can mitigate the occurrence of financial crisis while 
enhancing firms ‗operating performance and potentially providing capital market 
benefits. This study uses a unique set of data obtained via survey of Internal Audit 
Function management and publicly disclosed financial information to empirically 
examine corporate governance factors associated with adoption of ERM, potential 
operational and market performance benefits associated with adoption, and the impact of 
the risk factors disclosures on the firm‘s cost of equity and debt.  Specifically, this three 
(3) paper dissertation contributes to the existing academic literature by considering 
factors and benefits associated with Enterprise Risk Management (ERM).  The first paper 
of the dissertation considers the audit committee and IAF as potential determinants of 
ERM adoption.  The second paper of the dissertation provides evidence of operational 
and market performance benefits associated with firms adopting ERM.  The third paper 
of the dissertation examines the potential cost of capital impacts associated with non-
financial information, specifically, ERM related risk disclosures. Results of the study 
provide support for the hypothesized association between adoption and maturity of ERM 
processes and audit committee financial expertise as well as the internal audit function 
reporting independence.  In addition, the results provide some evidence of a positive 
relationship between the assessed ERM process maturity and operational performance.  
 
vi 
Finally, results indicate that increased disclosure of risk factors associated with ERM 
process is associated with reduced cost of capital.  Prior literature has relied primarily on 
surrogates to estimate ERM impacts.  While the reported results are based on a limited 
sample of firms, it provides direct evidence on the factors related to adoption of ERM 
processes as well as the potential benefits of adoption. Given the magnitude of the 
investment in ERM, this dissertation provides empirical evidence that there are potential 






This dissertation study was designed as three separate and distinct studies which 
considers the factors influencing Enterprise Risk Management Adoption, whether and the 
extent to which the adoption and maturity of Enterprise Risk Management is associated 
better operating and market performance than the associated industry class, and whether a 
greater number of risk factor disclosures is associated with decreased cost of capital or 
cost of equity.  As of the time of the completion of this dissertation, none of these three 
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Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) provides a framework to mange organizational 
risk within levels considered to be tolerable by the board of directors and/or the 
management of an organization. Prior research (Beasley et al. 2005, Pagach and Warr 
2007,) indicates that companies in the banking and finance industry were the most likely 
to implement ERM processes.  Despite being more likely to implement ERM processes, 
organizational failures within the banking and finance industry in the wake of the recent 
sub-prime mortgage crisis has been considered a primary factor contributing to the 
meltdown of the U.S. economy and financial markets.  The combination of increased 
likelihood of adoption and the lack of adequately addressing risk raise several questions 
related to ERM processes that this dissertation empirically investigates.  Specifically, this 
dissertation explores risk management by considering adoption, operational and market 
performance benefits, and incentives for increased disclosure of organizational risk 
factors using a unique data set of ERM adoption obtained via survey of Internal Audit 
Function management.   
The first paper of this dissertation explores whether quality characteristics of two 
corporate governance components, Audit Committees and Internal Audit Functions, are 
associated with adoption of ERM.  The oversight roles fulfilled by Audit Committees and 
risk assessment activities undertaken by Internal Audit Functions would suggest a direct 
interest in organizational risk management processes.  Based on this consideration, I 
hypothesize that characteristics of Audit Committees and Internal Audit Functions are 
positively associated with the adoption and maturity of ERM processes.  The results of 
 
2 
paper 1 finds evidence to support a positive association between audit committee 
financial expertise, and number of audit committee meetings, reporting independence and 
extent of quality assurance reviews of Internal Audit Functions with the adoption of ERM 
processes. 
Another question resulting from the risk management failure in the banking and 
financing industry is whether performance benefits exist for organizations adopting 
ERM.  I hypothesize that organizations invest in ERM with the expectation of a benefit, 
specifically enhanced operating and market performance.  Combining the assessed ERM 
maturity rating obtained via survey of Internal Audit Function Management with 
financial reporting (Compustat) and market performance (CRSP) data, I use a panel data 
regression model to test the association between ERM maturity and operating and 
performance benefits.   
Prior disclosure literature (Botosan 1997; Sengupta 1998; Botosan and Plumlee 2002; 
and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009), provides evidence that that increased disclosure are 
associated with reduced cost of debt and equity.  Consistent with this set of literature I 
hypothesize a negative association between the number of risk factors disclosed and the 
cost of capital.  Using a the set survey respondents and disclosed risk factors during the 
fiscal years between 2006 and 2008, results provide support of a negative association 
between risk factor disclosure and proxies of cost of debt and cost of equity.   
Together these three studies contribute to the literature in several areas.  Using a 
survey to specifically identify whether a company has adopted ERM and the maturity of 
those processes, reduces the potential noise included in prior adoption and market event 
studies.  In addition, the use of panel data to test examine operating and performance 
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benefits provides considers the use of both a new method as well as test of a benefit of 
ERM suggested by the COSO ERM Framework which has not been supported by 
empirical evidence.  Finally, the method of capturing risk factor disclosure and testing its 







ASSOCIATION BETWEEN AUDIT COMMITTEE AND INTERNAL AUDIT 
FUNCTION EFFECTIVENESS CHARACTERISTICS AND ENTERPRISE RISK 
MANAGEMENT ADOPTION 
Abstract: Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) provides a framework to mange 
organizational risk within the tolerable levels of the organization. The financial sector 
was considered to be one of the leading industries in the adoption of ERM processes, yet 
failures within the industry in the wake of the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis and 
subsequent meltdown of the U.S. economy and financial markets raise the questions 
about the quality of ERM processes. One of the most readily identified contributing 
factors of the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis and the resulting meltdown of the U.S. 
economy and financial markets was inadequate and ineffective organizational risk 
assessment and management processes. Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) provides a 
framework to manage organizational risk which should mitigate the occurrence of 
organizational financial crises while potentially enhancing company financial, 
operational, and market performance.  This study considers the association between 
characteristics of two corporate governance components, Audit Committee and Internal 
Audit Function characteristics and the likelihood of ERM adoption.  As opposed to using 
a proxy for ERM adoption, this study uses survey responses from Internal Audit Function 
management to identify whether ERM has been adopted by an organization.  Results of 
the study provide evidence that certain characteristics of audit committees (the number of 
audit committee meetings and percentage of audit committee members disclosed as 
financial experts) and internal audit functions (reporting independence and quality 
assurance review procedures) are associated with a firm‘s likelihood of adopting and 
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implementing governance mechanisms such as ERM processes. These findings provide 
additional evidence of the value and importance of effective audit committees and 
internal audit functions in providing risk oversight and monitoring within organizations. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Inadequate and ineffective risk assessment has been identified as one of many 
contributing factors to the recent financial crisis and the resulting meltdown of the U.S. 
economy and financial markets.  In addition to inadequate risk assessment, 
implementation of ineffective strategies and controls to mitigate identified risks can also 
be considered factors contributing to the financial scandals of the new millennium 
(Enron, WorldCom, etc.), losses sustained from natural disasters and terrorism, as well as 
poor management judgments.  These aforementioned issues have created major obstacles 
for the U.S. economy and tremendous losses throughout the financial investment 
community.   
To mitigate financial scandals and other firm detrimental events, regulators have 
implemented regulation designed to address investor concerns, such as the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).  SOX and enhanced investor monitoring have increased 
scrutiny of executives and board members (more specifically the audit committee) in 
fulfillment of their management and oversight functions respectively.  In response, 
executives and board members are likely increasing the emphasis placed on the 
implementation of firm-wide Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) to reduce the 
organizations‘ risks of failing to meet established goals and objectives, thereby making 
the area fruitful for research. 
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The Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework published by the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of the Treadway Commission (COSO-
ERM 2004) defines ERM as: 
… a process, effected by an entity‘s board of directors, management and other 
personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to 
identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within 
its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of 
entity objectives. 
The COSO-ERM Integrated Framework (2004) indicates that in order for 
management to maximize firm value, it must develop the organization‘s ―strategy and 
objectives to strike an optimal balance between growth and return goals and related risks, 
and efficiently and effectively deploy resources in pursuit of the entity‘s objectives.‖   
In addition, The Institute of Internal Auditor‘s (IIA) International Professional 
Practices Framework (IPPF) defines internal auditing as: 
…an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add 
value and improve an organization's operations. It helps an organization 
accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to 
evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, and 
governance processes. 
This definition explicitly indicates that the Internal Audit Function (IAF) has a 
professional responsibility to not only the corporate governance process, but also the risk 
management and control processes within the organization.
1
   
                                                             
1
 While the definition of internal audit states that that internal audit functions have a 
responsibility to ―evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management‖, the IIA‘s 
definition of internal auditing and the International Professional Practices Framework standards 
explicitly indicate that internal audit functions must be independent.  As a result, some 
components of ERM, including management of risk and setting of risk tolerances, would impair 
the internal audit function independence if performed.  Although risk management would present 
a conflict of independence for the internal audit function, one of the primary responsibilities of 
internal audit functions includes performing risk assessment for both the macro-level annual audit 
plan and on the micro-level for each audit, thereby not presenting a conflict to independence.  
This study does not specifically consider the extent of internal audit functions ERM 
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This study posits that characteristics of two corporate governance factors (Audit 
Committee and Internal Audit Function) are associated with companies adopting ERM.  
This study uses a survey of Internal Audit Function management to gather information 
regarding the status of ERM processes and characteristics of the Internal Audit Function 
and match this data to audit committee data obtained from proxy statements (DEF 14A) 
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and financial statement data 
obtained from Compustat. The results of this study contributes to existing literature by 
providing a deeper understanding of the association between enhanced corporate 
governance factors and the adoption and maturity of ERM processes.  Specifically, the 
results of the study indicate a significant positive association between the number of audit 
committee meetings, percentage of audit committee members disclosed as financial 
experts, reporting independence and quality assurance review practices of the Internal 
Audit Function and measures of ERM adoption and process maturity.   
This paper is structured as follows:  The next section (II) provides an overview of 
prior literature.  Section III provides the development of hypotheses followed by a 
discussion of the sample selection and research design.  The results of the study are 
provided in Section V followed by concluding remarks in the last section.  
2.2 PRIOR RESEARCH 
Prior related ERM studies include factors associated with ERM implementation 
including board independence, but have not included considerations of the characteristics 
of Audit Committees and Internal Audit Functions and the adoption and maturity of ERM 
processes.  In addition, many prior studies related to ERM adoption are limited as a result 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
responsibilities, but only the association between internal audit function characteristics and ERM 
adoption and maturity of ERM processes. 
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of the use of a potentially noisy proxy of ERM adoption.  An overview of the prior 
literature related to ERM adoption, Audit Committee Oversight, and Internal Audit 
Functions is detailed below.  
Factors Associated with ERM implementation 
Prior to the recent SEC requirement for companies to disclose ―the extent of the 
board‘s role in the risk oversight‖ (SEC 2009), only limited information was publicly 
available to identify companies which have implemented ERM, and even the newly 
mandated disclosures may not specifically indicate whether ERM has been implemented.  
As a result, many prior ERM studies utilize the public disclosure of the appointment or 
hiring of a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) or Risk Manager as a proxy of whether an 
organization implemented ERM.  Using announcements of Chief Risk Officer 
appointments as a proxy for ERM implementation, Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) and 
Pagach and Warr (2007) find evidence that there is a greater likelihood that larger and 
more highly leveraged firms will implement ERM.  Additionally, Pagach and Warr 
(2007) find that firms encountering greater earnings volatility, higher research and 
development expenses, with more business segments, and poorer stock market 
performance are more likely to implement ERM.  Pagach and Warr (2007) further 
document that firms in the financial or utilities industries are more likely to adopt ERM.   
Using an ordered logit model and survey responses from Chief Audit Executives, 
Beasley et al. (2005) find that the stage of ERM implementation is positively associated 
with entity size, the use of a Big-4 audit firm, and industry (banking, education, and 
insurance).  Beasley et al. (2005) also find a significant relationship between the stage of 
ERM implementation and the independence of the board of directors, CEO and CFO 
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request for increased Internal Audit Function risk management efforts, and the existence 
of a Chief Risk Officer.  In this same study, the authors find that Chief Audit Executives 
fulfill the role of the Chief Risk Officer in 92.6 percent (25 of 27) of companies which 
are in the process of implementing ERM without a formally dedicated Chief Risk Officer.   
Although Beasley et al. (2005) find that the existence of a Chief Risk Officer is 
significantly associated with the stage (maturity) of ERM processes in place; the use of 
external announcements of Chief Risk Officers as a proxy is a poor instrument for 
measuring ERM adoption.  Specifically, provided that a firm does not publicly disclose 
the appointment of a Chief Risk Officer when one exists or when ERM has been 
implemented without a Chief Risk Officer, companies would incorrectly be identified as 
not having implemented ERM.  Alternatively, companies which have publicly announced 
the appointment of a Chief Risk Officer  may not plan to implement ERM, but instead the 
Chief Risk Officers primary focus may only be related to financial or insurable risk as 
opposed to risk management throughout the organization.  As a result, these 
considerations present concerns that the Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) and Pagach and 
Warr (2007) studies which utilize Chief Risk Officer appointment announcements as a 
proxy for ERM implementation can be extended by clearly identifying ERM adoption or 
non-adoption, a contribution of this study.   
Other related studies in this area include Desender (2007) and Tonello (2007).  
Desender (2007) measures ERM adoption within the Pharmaceutical Preparations 
industry (SIC code – 2834) based on firm disclosure of a list of seventy items indicated 
within the COSO-ERM framework to evaluate the influence of two other corporate 
governance considerations, CEO duality and board of director independence, on the 
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extent of ERM processes.  Desender (2007) finds the separation of CEO and Chairman of 
the Board responsibilities (duality), interaction of board independence and lack of duality 
of the CEO and Chairman of the Board, firm size, financial risk (leverage), market risk 
(beta), and clients of KPMG to be positively associated with higher ERM adoption 
scores.  The results of Desender (2007) suggest that CEOs in general do not favor ERM 
implementation and are frequently able to limit the extent of ERM effectiveness when 
also fulfilling the role of the Chairman of the Board.  Tonello (2007) indicates that 
management incentives may be disproportionally tied to risk resulting in avoidance of 
considerations of certain risks within the ERM risk inventory and assessment phase.  
Consistent with Tonello‘s (2007) concerns, Pagach and Warr (2007) study the impact of 
the value of the CEOs stock options to stock equity in the company on ERM 
implementation efforts.  Pagach and Warr (2007) find that ERM is less likely to be 
implemented when the CEO has a higher ratio of stock option to equity holdings.  These 
findings suggest that CEO‘s personal portfolio may increase their preference for stock 
price volatility when they can exert enough power by holding the dual role of CEO and 
Chairman of the Board.  As a result, effective Audit Committees and Internal Audit 
Functions (through their interactions with the Audit Committee) are likely to insist on the 
adoption of ERM processes.   
Finally, using separate measures to proxy for ERM adoption (identification of a Chief 
Risk Officer and an aggregate risk disclosure score) within the Pharmaceutical 
Preparations industry (SIC code 2834), Desender and Lafuente Gonzalez (2009) find 
positive and consistent associations between their proxies of ERM adoption and firm 
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size, board of director independence, and concentration of ownership measures.
2
  In 
addition, Desender and Lafuente Gonzalez (2009) also find that audit fees (negative) and 
the use of a Big-4 auditor (positive) are associated with their measure of ERM risk 
disclosure but not with identification of a Chief Risk Officer.  Hoyt and Liebenberg 
(2009) find firm size and one-year change in market value to have a positive, and 
leverage and opacity to have a negative significant association with their measure of 
ERM adoption, for publically traded insurance companies (SIC codes 6311–6399).
3
   
Audit Committee Oversight 
Recent financial scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and Tyco were primarily 
perpetrated at the executive level.  As a result, the oversight responsibilities of the board 
of directors, more specifically the Audit Committee, have received increased attention.  
Consistent with these concerns, Jensen and Meckling‘s (1976) seminal discussion on 
agency theory and moral hazard suggests that agents provide advantages to organizations 
as a result of their greater willingness to accept risk in order to enhance the value of the 
firm.  However, Jensen and Meckling (1976) also suggest that as a result of the principal-
agent contract, the principal will need to monitor the activities of the agent to ensure that 
the agent is not shirking their management responsibilities or taking excessive risk.  
Consistent with this concern, Rezaee (2006) indicates that the Audit Committee has 
oversight responsibility for corporate governance, financial reporting, internal control, 
                                                             
2
 Measures of ownership concentration used are: the percentage of ownership of largest 
shareholder and the largest three shareholders, and a dummy variable in the event the largest 
shareholder owns more than a 20 percent share. 
 
3
 Hoyt and Liebenberg (2009) also find additional variables specifically related to insurance 
companies to be associated with ERM adoption.  
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and risk management.  Rezaee (2006) states that, the Chief Audit Executive, the highest 
ranking employee of the Internal Audit Function:  
…can assume responsibility for the proper design of the ERM concept and obtain 
a firm commitment from the board of directors, audit committee, and top 
executives for effective implementation of ERM in addressing the organization‘s 
risk profiles, appetite, exposure and controls. (A-419)   
Rezaee (2006) further states:   
Effective design and implementation of the ERM concept requires commitment 
and oversight responsibility by the full board of directors and audit committee, 
and proactive participation by top executives and internal auditors in 
implementing ERM. (A-419)   
Finally, Rezaee (2006) indicates that the Audit Committee should rely on the IAF to 
provide feedback on the design, implementation and operation of ERM.  These comments 
help provide a better understanding and additional support of the involvement and 
importance of the roles of effective Audit Committees and Internal Audit Functions 
related to ERM adoption and processes.  As a result, studies have noted the increased 
responsibilities assumed by Audit Committees in review of organizational risk. 
Audit Committee research has recently received significant attention with a large 
portion of studies focusing on member independence from operations management 
duties.  These prior studies find Audit Committee independence to be significantly 
associated with higher external audit fees and more extensive audit procedures (Abbott et 
al. 2003) and negatively associated with auditor dismissals following going concern 
opinions (Carcello and Neal 2000), fraudulent financial reporting (Beasley et al. 2000), 
earnings management (Klein 2002), and restatements (Abbott et al. 2004; Agrawal and 
Chadha 2005).  Section 301 of SOX requires Audit Committees of companies traded on 
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national exchanges to be comprised completely of independent board members.  Despite 
this requirement, all independent Audit Committees are not of the same effectiveness.   
Brancato et al. (2006) finds that the Audit Committee has been delegated either 
complete (sixty-six percent of respondents) or shared responsibility for risk oversight 
(twenty-three percent of respondents) for eighty-nine percent of companies surveyed.  
Scarbrough et al. (1998) find that independent Audit Committees are more likely to 
frequently meet with Chief Audit Executives and review the results of internal audits; 
thereby likely increasing their awareness of organizational risk.  These considerations 
lend additional evidence regarding the role of the Audit Committee in the risk assessment 
and management process and potential adoption of ERM processes.   
Internal Audit Function 
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) International Professional Practices 
Framework (IPPF) standards specify that management is responsible for setting the 
organization‘s risk appetite, imposing risk management processes, and making decisions 
about risk responses and that the Internal Audit Function must maintain independence 
and objectivity in order to fulfill its responsibilities by remaining independent of such 
management responsibilities.  However, the IAF could manage the risk assessment 
process without assuming the previously identified management responsibilities, while 
maintaining its objectivity.  Consistent with the Institute of Internal Auditors definition of 
internal auditing, the standards
4
 state that the Internal Audit Function ―must evaluate the 
effectiveness and contribute to the improvement of risk management processes.‖   
                                                             
4




Anderson and Leandri (2006) suggest that Internal Audit Functions are one of the few 
functions within an organization which have an ―enterprise-wide view and scope‖ which 
is highly valuable.  The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) International Professional 
Practices Framework (IPPF) standards
5
 also require Internal Audit Functions to perform a 
periodic risk assessment (at least annually) to develop a risk-based audit plan.  Although 
risk assessments can be quantitative, qualitative, or a combination of the two (hybrid), it 
should be a continuous process and include the organization‘s entire risk universe.  
Therefore, the involvement of the Internal Audit Function with ERM processes 
potentially reduces duplication of efforts and associated costs of an additional member of 
senior management while providing a broader risk assessment based on the in-depth 
understanding of business processes and risks obtained from providing assurance and 
consulting services throughout the entire organization.  Prawitt et al. (2008) find 
abnormal accruals to be significantly lower for companies with more experienced and 
independent Internal Audit Functions (as measured by Chief Audit Executives reporting 
to the Audit Committee).   
2.3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The primary goal of implementing ERM is to manage the overall financial risk as 
well as risks related to strategy, operations, reporting, and regulatory compliance.  
Managing such risks on an integrated organization-wide perspective is expected to reduce 
organizational risk and enhance the likelihood of achieving organizational goals and 
objectives which frequently include financial performance, market returns, customer 
satisfaction, new products and services development, and stockholder satisfaction.  As 
discussed in the previous literature section, there are many reasons which may be 
                                                             
5
 IIA IPPF Standard 2010 – Planning 
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attributable to companies implementing ERM, all of which are not currently known.  
Despite the overwhelming risk management oversight responsibility entrusted to Audit 
Committees and Internal Audit Functions, to my knowledge, the influence of these 
components of corporate governance have not received much consideration in relation to 
ERM adoption, although an inherent relationship exists between these governance 
structures and ERM.   
Audit Committee Association with ERM Adoption 
Regulatory change imposed by SOX requires publically traded companies to have an 
Audit Committee whose members are independent of firm management, with at least one 
member who is identified as a financial expert
6
 (or the disclosure of reasons for the lack 
of identification of a financial expert).  SOX also requires Audit Committee involvement 
in hiring and firing decisions of the external auditor and discussion with external auditors 
of any audit issues which management and the external auditors are not able to agree 
upon.  These requirements provide additional opportunity to ensure that the Audit 
Committee and the Board of Directors are aware of organizational risks while also 
implicitly suggesting an increase in fiduciary responsibilities of committee members.
7
  
While Audit Committees are becoming over extended as a result of their extensive 
and continually expanding oversight responsibilities, Audit Committees exhibiting 
greater effectiveness (as measured by the number of members, meetings, percentage of 
                                                             
6
 The identification of Audit Committee Financial Expert is based on the number of Audit 




 While many disclosures indicate that identification as a financial expert does not increase 
the liability of the director, disclosure of directors as an Audit Committee financial expert does 
implicitly represent enhanced awareness and skills related to financial risks as well as 
understanding of financial reporting.  
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members that are identified as financial experts, presence of the Chairman of the Board 
on the audit committee, CEO attendance of audit committee meetings, and the Audit 
Committees review of IAF risk assessment) are more likely to ensure that risks are 
brought to the attention of the full Board of Directors and management and are properly 
addressed.  As a result, in addition to receiving feedback from internal and external 
auditors, Audit Committees with such characteristics would be more inclined to require 
ERM adoption:   
Hypothesis 1 – Companies that exhibit more effective Audit Committee 
characteristics are more likely to adopt ERM processes. 
 
IAF Association with ERM Adoption 
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) revised its listing standards in the wake of 
the collapse of Enron and WorldCom and now requires all listing companies to maintain 
an internal audit activity (NYSE Corporate Governance Rules—Section 303A).  
Although the listing standards do not provide specific considerations for such internal 
audit activities, companies which merely intend to comply with the requirement are more 
likely to create small Internal Audit Functions with limited scope, while organizations 
investing in an effective Internal Audit Function do so as a result of potential benefits in 
the form of risk assessment, control evaluation, consulting, and other value-added 
activities which effective Internal Audit Functions can provide.  Such an investment in an 
organizational oversight function is indicative of the Board of Directors, the Audit 
Committees‘, or executive managements‘ desire to evaluate and manage risk and 
controls.  Internal Audit Functions of greater effectiveness are in turn more likely to be 
more experienced in risk assessment while also having greater exposure with the Audit 
Committee thereby highlighting potential benefits and the need for ERM adoption.  
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Provided that an organization has invested in a more effective Internal Audit Function, as 
measured by the Internal Audit Function‘s independence, and staff competency, it is also 
likely that such organizations would also invest in the adoption an ERM program: 
Hypothesis 2 – Companies with more effective Internal Audit Function 




This study uses data obtained from a web-based survey emailed to Internal Audit 
Function management
8
 of U.S.-based publicly traded firms.
9
  Survey responses are 
matched to financial statement data obtained from Compustat and Audit Committee 
characteristics obtained manually from proxy statements (DEF 14) filed with the SEC. 
The survey, included in the appendix (Table 1), asked respondents to indicate whether 
their organization has implemented ERM (formal implementation, informal 
implementation, or no implementation) as well as the maturity of implementation based 
on a six point scale for each of the three fiscal years of the period between 2006 and 
2008.  Each of these measures is modeled in separate regressions to increase the 
significance of statistical tests and evaluate the consistency of statistical tests based on 
alternative measurements of the dependent variable.   
                                                             
8
 Surveys were sent to Internal Audit Function management in order to obtain characteristics 
of the internal audit function.  In addition, Internal Audit Functions have been noted in prior 
studies (Beasley et al. 2005; Institute of Internal Auditors 2006 Common Body of Knowledge 
survey) to be involved or familiar with the ERM activities, thereby having appropriate knowledge 
of ERM adoption and ability to assess ERM process maturity. 
 
9
 Survey link and follow-up requests were emailed to Internal Audit Function Management 
between July 15, 2009 and October 21, 2009.  A copy of the survey email request and the survey 
are included in the appendix. 
 
18 
The lack of publically available information regarding ERM implementation, has led 
most prior ERM adoption studies (Liebenberg and Hoyt 2003; Pagach and Warr 2007 - 
SSRN; Beasley et al. 2007) to use formal announcement of Chief Risk Officer 
appointments identified in press releases and SEC Filings as a proxy for ERM adoption.  
Despite the Beasley et al. (2005) finding that Chief Risk Officer appointment is 
associated with ERM implementation stage, the use of Chief Risk Officer appointment as 
a proxy variable for ERM adoption is likely to be a noisy as such a proxy fails to provide 
positive assurance of ERM adoption or lack thereof.  The possible noise of such proxies 
is also identified by the results of the IIA‘s 2006 Common Body of Knowledge (CBOK) 
survey which finds that Internal Audit Functions perform a substantial portion of ERM 
processes (37.6 percent) and the Beasley et al. (2005) finding that the Chief Audit 
Executive fulfills the role of the Chief Risk Officer either formally or informally for more 
than 40 percent
10
 of responding firms which have implemented ERM.  To reduce the 
potential noise of the dependent variable (ERM Adoption and Stage of ERM Adoption), I 
use survey responses obtained from Internal Audit Function management of U.S. based 
companies
11
 to specifically identify whether and to what extent (stage of implementation) 
their organization has adopted and implemented ERM processes for fiscal years between 
2006 and 2009.  The survey gathered information regarding Internal Audit Function 
                                                             
10
 Provided that announcements of Chief Audit Executive‘s formal (10.7 percent) or informal 
(29.8 percent) acceptance of Chief Risk Officer responsibilities are not publicly disclosed, the 
results presented by Beasley et al. (2005) provide additional evidence of the possibility that 




 Survey link was emailed to Internal Audit Function management identified via Internet 
searches using various internal audit titles.  In addition, three local IIA chapter officers distributed 




effectiveness characteristics (reporting independence, staff size, percentage of staff 
holding certification (CIA, CPA, CISA, etc.), risk assessment type, quality assurance 
review processes, and Internal Audit Function budget information) and Audit Committee 
effectiveness characteristics (CEO attendance of Audit Committee meetings, Audit 
Committee review and approval of the Internal Audit Functions annual risk assessment 
and audit plan).  Additional publically available Audit Committee effectiveness measures 
(number of Audit Committee members, number of Audit Committee meetings, number of 
Audit Committee financial experts) were gathered from SEC Filings (obtained from 
SECs Interactive Data Electronic Applications (IDEA)).   
Consistent with the findings of prior ERM adoption literature, I control for firm size 
and leverage (Pagach and Warr 2007; Desender, 2007; Desender and Lafuente Gonzalez 
2009; Liebenberg and Hoyt 2003; Hoyt and Liebenberg 2009).  In addition, consistent 
with findings of Desender (2007) and Desender and Lafuente Gonzalez (2009), I include 
variables to control for other corporate governance mechanisms including board 
independence and duality of the CEO and Chairman of the Board roles and the use of 
external auditor type in the models.  Following Pagach and Warr (2008) and Hoyt and 
Liebenberg (2009), I also include opacity and slack as measures of financial risk based on 
consideration of liquidation of intangible assets and availability of cash on hand 
respectively. 
The two previously stated hypotheses are tested using two models differing in the 
measurement of the dependent variable (ERMADPT2, ERMADPT3, and ERMMTRY) 
and type of regression model; a logit model (Lienberg and Hoyt 2003; Pagach and Warr 
2007) is used for the binary ERM adoption dependent variable (ERMADPT2) and an 
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ordered logit model (Beasley et al. 2005) is used for the ERM adoption variable which 
includes an informal adoption measure (ERMADPT3) and ERM maturity stage measure 
(ERMMTRY) dependent variables.   
This study uses several measures of corporate governance components of effective 
Audit Committees and Internal Audit Function effectiveness to evaluate the potential 
association with whether firms adopt ERM and the maturity of ERM processes.  Prior 
literature considers the number of Audit Committee members, number of Audit 
Committee meetings, and the disclosure of the existence of a financial expert on the 
Audit Committee as characteristics that are positively associated with more effective 
Audit Committees.
12
  The number of Audit Committee members (ACMem) is frequently 
considered to be associated with increased responsibility and importance.  The number of 
Audit Committee meetings (ACMeet) is considered to be associated with the level of 
oversight and has been found to be associated with increased audit quality (Abbott et al. 
2003) and inversely related to the occurrence of fraud (Beasley et al. 2000).  SOX 
(Section 407) mandated disclosure of at least one Audit Committee Financial Expert 
(ACFE) or the reason for the lack of an Audit Committee Financial Expert to ensure that 
boards have appropriate oversight of potential audit, financial, risk, and control concerns 
of the organization.  I use the percentage of the number of disclosed Audit Committee 
Financial Experts to Audit Committee members (%ACFE), as opposed to the existence of 
a single financial expert as a measure of Audit Committee competence and effectiveness.   
                                                             
12
 Prior studies (Bédard et al. 2004; Klein 2002) have also used Audit Committee member 
independence as an additional measure of Audit Committee effectiveness. SOX requires all 
members of the Audit Committee to be independent: therefore this item is not included in the 
study as the item should not have any variance during the post-SOX adoption period considered 
by this study (fiscal years 2006 to 2008).   
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In addition to these factors, three additional measures of Audit Committee 
effectiveness this study considers are the membership of the Chairman of the Board on 
the Audit Committee (COBMemAC) and the Audit Committee‘s review of the Internal 
Audit Functions‘ risk assessment (ACRskAssmt) and the attendance of Audit Committee 
meetings by the CEO (ACMtgCEO) which is expected to be inverse (negative) measure 
as a result of a potential filtering effect that the CEO‘s attendance of Audit Committee 
meetings may have.  The role of the Chairman of the Board has an increased ability to set 
the agenda for board meetings and ensure that noteworthy items, including consideration 
of organizational risk and opportunity, and resource considerations are brought to the 
attention of the full board to ensure appropriate action is considered.  The Audit 
Committee‘s review and approval of the risk assessment suggests evidence that the Audit 
Committee provides an active oversight role as both a recipient and source of potential 
risk factors.  The last proposed measure of Audit Committee effectiveness, CEO 
attendance of Audit Committee meetings, is expected to reduce the effectiveness of the 
Audit Committee by mitigating benefits achieved by requiring Audit Committee‘s to be 
independent. 
The independence of the Internal Audit Function reporting has received extensive 
consideration as one of the primary factors associated with Internal Audit Function 
effectiveness.  Best practices have long suggested benefits associated with Chief Audit 
Executive‘s reporting to Audit Committees to ensure independence (IAFRptInd) of the 
audit function due to less filtered information resulting from scope limitations, budget 
constraints, or concerns of job security.  The annual budget of the Internal Audit Function 
(lnIAFBgt) provides a measure of both organizational and financial support which should 
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be associated with expected performance in evaluating risk, controls, and consulting 
efforts.  While the number of Internal Audit Function staff full-time equivalents 
(lnIAFTE) provides a measure of the Internal Audit Functions ability to provide audit 
coverage, this variable is likely to be highly correlated with other variables including 
organization size, number of locations and business segments, and industry risk.  The 
percentage of Internal Audit Function staff members who are certified (CPA, CIA, CISA, 
CFE, etc.) provides a measure of staff competency (%IAFCert).  The performance of 
both internal and external quality assurance reviews of Internal Audit Function processes 
(IAFQAR) is conducted to ensure not only compliance with audit standards and 
processes, but also to identify potential opportunities for improvement to processes.  
Finally, I use the type (rotational, hybrid, or risk based approach) of audit plan (IAFPlan) 
used as a measure of the effectiveness of audit plan coverage.  Each of these measures is 
expected to represent specific measures of Audit Committee and Internal Audit Function 
effectiveness and be associated with an organization‘s decision to adopt and maturity of 
ERM processes.   
Although one of the anticipated contributions of this study was the development of 
consolidated measures of Audit Committee and Internal Audit Function effectiveness, an 
attempt to perform factor analysis did not provide reliable measures which demonstrated 
convergent and discriminate validity.
13
 As a result, the study individually evaluates the 
six individual measures of Audit Committee and Internal Audit Function characteristics.  
                                                             
13
 Factor analysis was conducted on six proposed measures of Audit Committee effectiveness 
(ACMem, ACMeet, %ACFE, COBMemAC, ACRskAsmt, ACMtgCEO) and six proposed 
measures of Internal Audit Function effectiveness (IAFRptInd, lnIAFBgt, lnIAFTE, %IAFCert, 
IAFQAR, IAFPlan).  The results of the factor analysis provided a six factors solution with Eigen 
values greater than 1.  In addition, factor loadings were low for most factors as well as multiple 
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I use the following general model to perform both logit and ordered logit regressions 
to evaluate the likelihood of an association between ERM adoption or maturity of ERM 
adoption and the effectiveness of the Audit Committee and Internal Audit Function 
characteristics: 
ERMMSR = f{ SIZE, LEV, stdNI, OPACITY, SLACK, GROWTH, ∆MVE, 
%BODInd, CEOCOB, BIG4, FIN, UTIL, ACCharacteristics, 
IAFCharacteristics }      (1) 
With the three alternative dependent variable measures are defined as: 
ERMMSR – one of three measures of the ERM implementation: 
 ERMADPT2 – binary variable equal to 1 if company indicated formal 




 ERMADPT3 – ordinal variable taking on one of three values based on 
survey response equal to 2 if company indicated formal adoption of ERM, 
and 1 for companies indicating informal ERM adoption, and 0 for 
companies indicating they have not adopted ERM.
15
 
 ERMMTRY – ordinal variable assuming one of six values based on 
process maturity levels defined by CoBIT obtained via survey respondents 
assessed rating of ERM process maturity assuming the value of 5, for 
―Optimized‖; 4, for ―Managed and Measurable‖; 3, for ―Defined Process‖; 
2, for ―Repeatable but Intuitive‖; 1, for ―Initial/Adhoc‖; and 0, for ―Non-
Existent‖ ERM processes for fiscal years between 2006 and 2008.
16
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
occurrences of cross loadings and low reliability scores.  Appendix 2 provides additional 
information as well as the factor loading table results. 
 
14
 Although the survey also allowed a response indicating informal adoption, these 
observations are excluded when using the ERMADPT2 binary variable measure. 
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 In order to consider organizations which consider their adoption of ERM to be informal but 
existent, I use an ordered logit model to evaluate results for consistency and robustness.  
Responses indicating informal adoption were excluded from the logit regression model using the 
ERMADPT2 dependent variable, thereby reducing sample size (from 245 to 148).   
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 Expanded definitions of the stage of ERM process activities are included in the survey as a 
measure of the maturity of the ERM adoption (ERMMTRY).  The descriptions used in the survey 
for these six classifications (adopted from CoBIT) are as follows: 5 - Optimized – Good 
processes are followed and automated 4 - Managed and Measureable – Processes are monitored 
and measured; 3 - Defined Process – Processes are documented and communicated; 2 - 
Repeatable but Intuitive – Processes follow a regular pattern; 1 - Initial/Adhoc – Processes are ad 




The variables of primary interest in the evaluation of the stated hypotheses are 
defined as: 
Audit Committee (AC) Characteristics: 
 ACMem – the number on the audit committee members obtained from 
proxy statements filed with the SEC for the 2008 fiscal year. 
 ACMeet – the number of audit committee meetings reported in the proxy 
statement for the company‘s 2008 fiscal year. 
 %ACFE – percentage of audit committee members identified as ―financial 
experts‖ within the fiscal 2008 proxy statement to the total number of 
audit committee members. 
 COBMemAC – binary variable coded as ―1‖ if the chairman of the board 
was a member of the audit committee; and ―0‖ otherwise. 
 ACRskAssmt – provides a measure of the extent to which the audit 
committee is involved in the review and approval of the IAF‘s risk 
assessment and audit plan.  It is computed as the proportion of scored 
responses based on a 5 point scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree) to 
the question ―The [CEO, CFO, Audit Committee] reviews and approves 
the IAF‘s annual Risk assessment plan‖.  The ratio of the audit committee 
score to the sum of the score for CEO, CFO, and Audit Committee review 
and approval of the IAF risk assessment plan.   
 ACMeetCEO – measure of the frequency of attendance of the CEO at the 
audit committee meetings based on a 4-point scale (never, infrequently, 
frequently, and always). 
 
IAF Characteristics: 
 IAFRptInd – measure of the independence of the IAF based survey 
questions regarding the extent of IAF reporting, ability to be terminated 
by, and budgetary review and approval by the CEO, CFO, and Audit 
Committee.
17
   
 lnIAFBgt – Natural log of the budget of the Internal Audit Function 
reported in survey responses. 
 lnIAFTE – Natural log of the full-time equivalent employed by the 
internal audit function.   
 IAFQAR – ordinal measure of the extent of quality assurance reviews of 
the IAF conducted.  Assumes the value of ―0‖ for organizations not 
conducting either internal or external QAR, ―1‖ for organizations 
participating in either internal or external QAR, but not both, and ―2‖ for 
companies which have both internal and external QAR‘s conducted.  
                                                             
17
 The composite measure follows the method used by Abbott et. al. (2010).  The level of 
agreement is measured on a five point scale from Strongly Disagree (0) to Strongly agree (5) and 
summing and dividing the values of the responses associated with the values of the three Audit 
Committee measures (numerator) by the sum of responses from all nine responses which include 
the CEO and CFO as well as the Audit Committee measure (denominator). 
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 %IAFCERT – is a measure of the percentage of IAF employees having at 
least one professional certification (CPA, CIA, CISA, etc.).   
 IAFPlan – ordinal measure of the consideration of risk as the basis for the 
development of the IAF‘s audit plan coded as ―0‖ for a rotational, ―1‖ 
hybrid (rotational and risk based), and ―2‖ for risk based audit plan.  
 
I also include variables noted as significant in prior studies to as a control for 
additional differences in firms which may be associated with ERM adoption or maturity.  
These control variables are defined as follows: 
SIZE – natural log of total assets for the 2008 year end (Compustat item A6).
18
  
LEV – leverage is calculated as Total liabilities/Total Assets for the 2008 year 
end (Compustat item A181/A6).
19
  
stdNI – standard deviation of the previous 5 year span of net income (fiscal years 
2004 through fiscal year 2008). 
OPACITY – computed as the ratio of intangible assets to total assets (Compustat 
item A33/A6). 
SLACK – calculated as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets 
for 2008 (Compustat item A1/A6) 
GROWTH – computed as the change in revenues between fiscal year 2008 and 
2007 scaled by 2007 revenues (Compustat item A12).
20
 
∆MVE – Measure of the change in the market value of equity (MVE) of the firm 
between 2008 and 2007 scaled by the 2007 MVE (Compustat items 
A199*A25). 
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 There has been a lack of a consistent proxy of firm size in prior ERM studies.  Lienberg 
and Hoyt (2003) define size as the natural logarithm of the three-year average of total assets; 
Pagah and Warr (2007) use a one period measure of the natural logarithm of the market value of 
equity (MVE) corresponding to the year of CRO appointment announcement.  Desender (2007) 
uses a one period (corresponding to the year of disclosure) measure of the natural log of revenues 
as a proxy for firm size.  For the purpose of this study I define size as the natural log of total 
assets for fiscal year 2008 (period  of the survey). 
 
19
Lienberg and Hoyt (2003) define leverage as the three-year average of total liabilities/total 
assets; Pagah and Warr (2007) use a one period measure of leverage (total liabilities/total assets) 
corresponding to the year of CRO appointment announcement, Desender (2007) uses a one period 
measure of long-term debt scaled by total assets as the leverage measure.  Following the methods 
of Pagach and Warr, I use a one year measure (2008) of total liabilities scaled by total assets. 
 
20
 Pagach and Warr (2007) use Research and Development costs as a measure for growth.  
Due to the limited availability of Research and Development costs for certain industries and 





CEOCOB – Binary indicator variable equal to 1 for organizations in which the 
CEO and chairman of the board positions are held by the same individual 
(duality) during fiscal year 2008; 0 otherwise (Desender 2007; Desender 
and Lafuente Gonzalez 2009).
21
 
%BODINDEP – Percentage of board of director members who are reported 
within the proxy statement to be independent board members in 
accordance with securities listings standards (independent members/total 




BIG4 – binary variable labeled 1 if the company has a big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise 
for the 2008 fiscal year end (Beasley et al. 2005; Desender 2007; 




Following the study of Beasley et al. (2005), I also evaluate the model using an 
ordered logit regression with alternative ordinal measures of ERM adoption and process 
maturity (ERMADPT3 and ERMMTRY) as defined above.  The results provide 
additional consideration for support and potentially a better understanding of Audit 
Committee and Internal Audit Function characteristics which are associated with 
adoption of and the maturity. 
2.5 RESULTS 
An on-line survey link was emailed
24
 to 1,631 IAF management level employees 
throughout the U.S. and other countries identified via web-based keyword searches for 
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 Proxy statements were reviewed to identify whether duality existed in the position of CEO 
and Board Chair (CEOCOB). 
 
22
 Board independence was based upon the board member independence disclosure included 
in proxy statements (DEF 14A) filed with the SEC. 
 
23
 Desender (2007) uses four dummy variables to individually indentify whether any specific 
Big-Four accounting firm (Ernst & Young, Deloitte and Touche LLP, KPMG, PwC) was 
associated with a higher ERM score.  Based on an ERM disclosure measure, Desender (2007) 
finds that KPMG clients were significantly more likely to adopt ERM processes.  Consistent with 
Beasley et al. (2005), I use a single dummy variable to identify whether a firm is audited by one 






  As presented in the Table 2.1 (Panel A) - Sample Description, 
despite receiving 496 survey responses (30.4 percent response rate), only 249 were U.S. 
based publicly traded companies with complete responses regarding Internal Audit 
Function characteristics and ERM based information necessary for this study and able to 
be matched to Compustat and SEC Proxy filings.
26
 Panel B of Table 2.1 provides an 
overview of the number of sample responses by industry classification.  Industries with 
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 Survey link and follow-up requests were emailed to Internal Audit Function Management 
between July 15, 2009 and October 21, 2009. A copy of the survey email request and the survey 
are included in the appendix. 
 
25
 Keyword searches focused on IAF titles including ―Chief Audit Executive‖, ―CAE‖, ―Vice 
President of Internal Audit‖, ―VP Internal Audit‖, ―Internal Audit Vice President‖, ―Director of 
Internal Audit‖, and ―Internal Audit Director‖ using Google and Lexis/Nexus. 
 
26
 Survey reliability analysis will be conducted after the expansion of the sample obtained via 
second distribution of the survey. 
 
27
 Companies surveyed were selected based on identification of the internal audit function 
management level employees which an email address could be identified as well as companies 
included in survey distribution list emailed by local Institute of internal audit chapters. 
28
 The survey captures multiple measures of ERM adoption (not adopted, informal adoption, 
and formal adoption) and maturity values (ranging from 0 to 5).  Therefore, although the final 
sample in table 1 indicates 249 sample observations, the total number of observations may be 
lower depending on the type of regression used (i.e. when using the logit model, observations 
indicating informal implementation are blank, thereby reducing the sample size to 149). 









Non-Public Company Responses 
 
(164) 















Panel C of Table 2.1 provides a summary of the leadership of ERM processes based 
on the categorized response of ERM adoption; Formal, Informal, or No Adoption 
(ERMADPT3).  The results indicate that for companies which reported formal adoption, 
ERM leadership is more frequently provided by the Chief Audit Executive (30%) than by 
the Chief Risk Officer (23 percent).  This result is also consistent for responses indicating 
informal adoption as well, with the ERM leader being identified as the Chief Audit 
Executive (24 percent) more frequently than the Chief Risk Officer (13 percent).  The 
results also suggest that ERM leadership is also frequently provided by the Finance 
function (CFO and Finance Organization) as well as committees (ERM Committees) for 
both formal and informal ERM adopters.  As a result, this brings into question the extent 
of noise in the dependent variables which primarily focus on the appointment of Chief 
Risk Officers as a proxy for ERM adoption. The descriptive statistics of the samples are 
included in Table 2.3 (Panels A – D) provides an overview of the mean and median 
values of variables included in the study as well as the results of univariate t-tests (Panel 
A) of means between survey response firms which have not adopted ERM and those 
which have formally adopted ERM (ERMADPT2).  The results of tests of mean 
differences support prior findings that larger (SIZE) more highly leveraged (LEV) firms 
with more independent boards (%BODInd) are more likely to adopt ERM.  As indicated 
by prior studies, respondents of more highly regulated industries, financial services (FIN) 
and utilities (UTIL), were more likely to report they had formally adopted ERM than had 
not.  In addition, these results provide initial evidence that firms which formally adopt 






TABLE 2.1 (Panel B) – ERM Adoption and Maturity Mean Averages by Industry Categorization 
  
ERMADPT2 ERMADPT3 ERMMTRY 
Industry 
2 digit 
SIC Codes Count Mean 
% 
Sample Count Mean 
% 
Sample Count Mean 
% 
Sample 
Construction 15-17 3 1.00 2% 6 1.50 2% 6 3.50 3% 
Consumer Products & Food 20-33 17 0.71 11% 46 1.15 18% 40 2.35 19% 
Energy 10-14,46,49 17 0.94 11% 31 1.48 12% 27 2.70 13% 
Financial Services 60-64,67 27 0.82 18% 44 1.39 18% 35 2.26 17% 
Information & Communication 48,73,78-79,84 19 0.63 13% 26 1.19 10% 21 2.10 10% 
Manufacturing 34-39 31 0.58 21% 43 1.12 17% 37 2.24 18% 
Personal Services, Health  
   & Dependent Care 
72,80,83 
 5 0.60 3% 5 1.20 2% 4 2.50 2% 
Professional & Commercial  
    Service, & Education 
75,76,82,  
87,89 5 0.40 3% 5 0.80 2% 5 2.00 2% 
Retail & Wholesale 50-59 20 0.55 13% 29 1.07 12% 20 2.35 10% 
Transportation 40-42,44-













































Chief Audit Executive (CAE) 31 2.9 30% 
 
24 2.45 24% 
 
2 1.5 5% 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 2 2.0 2% 
 
6 3.5 6% 
 
2 2.0 5% 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 10 2.9 10% 
 
16 2.1 16% 
 
4 1.5 9% 
Chief Risk Officer (CRO) 24 3.0 23% 
 
13 1.8 13% 
 
2 2.0 5% 
Dir. ERM 3 3.0 3% 
 
1 2.0 1% 
    ERM Committee 16 3.0 15% 
 
17 2.6 17% 
    Finance Organization 10 3.2 10% 
 
1 2.0 1% 
    Legal Counsel 6 3.2 6% 
 
7 1.7 7% 
    Other 2 3.0 2% 
 
7 2.3 7% 
 
15 0.6 35% 
Blank 1   1%   8 2.5 8%   18 0.6 42% 
Totals 105 2.98 100% 
 
100 2.29 100% 
 










TABLE 2.2 - Variable Definitions 
 
ERMADPT2  Binary variable equal to 1 if company indicated formal adoption of ERM, and 0 for 
companies indicating they have not adopted ERM.   
 
ERMADPT3 Ordinal variable taking on one of three values based on survey response equal to 2 if 
company indicated formal adoption of ERM, and 1 for companies indicating informal 
ERM adoption, and 0 for companies indicating they have not adopted ERM.   
 
ERMMTRY Ordinal variable assuming one of six values based on process maturity levels defined by 
CoBIT obtained via survey respondents assessed rating of ERM process maturity 
assuming the value of 5, for ―Optimized‖; 4, for ―Managed and Measurable‖; 3, for 
―Defined Process‖; 2, for ―Repeatable but Intuitive‖; 1, for ―Initial/Adhoc‖; and 0, for 
―Non-Existent‖ ERM processes.  
 
SIZE Natural log of total assets for the 2007 year end (Compustat item A6).   
 
LEV Leverage is calculated as Total liabilities/Total Assets for the 2007 year end (Compustat 
item A181/A6).   
 
stdNI Calculated as the standard deviation of the net income for fiscal years 2004 – 2008.   
 
OPACITY Computed as the ratio of intangible assets to total assets (Compustat item A33/A6).  
 
SLACK Calculated as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets for 2008 
(Compustat item A1/A6).  
 
GROWTH Computed as the change in revenues between fiscal year 2008 and 2007 scaled by 2007 
revenues (Compustat item A12).   
 
∆MVE Measure of the change in the market value of equity (MVE) of the firm between 2008 
and 2007 scaled by the 2007 MVE (Compustat items A199*A25).   
 
CEOCOB Binary indicator variable equal to 1 for organizations in which the CEO and chairman of 
the board positions are held by the same individual (duality); 0 otherwise.   
 
%BODInd Percentage of board of director members who are reported within the proxy statement to 
be independent board members in accordance with securities listings standards.  
 
BIG4 Binary variable labeled 1 if the company has a big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise during the 
most recent fiscal year end.   
 
FIN Dummy variable used to classify companies in the financial, banking, and insurance 
industries.  Coded as ―1‖ for companies with a 6XXX level SIC code, otherwise coded 
as ―0‖. 
 
UTIL Dummy variable used to classify companies in the utilities industry.  Assumes a value of 
―1‖ for companies with a 49XX level SIC code, otherwise coded as ―0‖. 
 
ACMem Number on the audit committee obtained from proxy statements filed with the Securities 




TABLE 2.2 - Variable Definitions (continued) 
 
ACMeet Number of audit committee meetings reported in the proxy statement for the company‘s 
2008 fiscal year.   
 
%ACFE Percentage of audit committee members identified as ―financial experts‖ within the 
fiscal 2008 proxy statement to the total number of audit committee members.   
 
COBMemAC Dummy variable taking a value of ―1‖ where the chairman of the board of directors is a 
member of the audit committee, otherwise coded as ―0‖. 
 
ACRskAsmt Measure of the extent to which the audit committee is involved in the review and 
approval of the IAF‘s risk assessment and audit plan.  It is computed as the proportion 
of scored responses based on a 5 point scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree) to the 
question ―The [CEO, CFO, Audit Committee] reviews and approves the IAF‘s annual 
Risk assessment plan‖.  The ratio of the audit committee score to the sum of the score 
for CEO, CFO, and Audit Committee review and approval of the IAF risk assessment 
plan. 
 
ACMtgCEO Measure of the frequency of attendance of the CEO at the audit committee meetings 
based on a 4-point scale (never, infrequently, frequently, and always). 
 
IAFRptInd Measure of the independence of the IAF based survey questions regarding the extent of 
IAF reporting, ability to be terminated by, and budgetary review and approval by the 
CEO, CFO, and Audit Committee.   
lnIAFBgt Natural log of the budget of the Internal Audit Function reported in survey responses. 
 
lnIAFTE Natural log of the full-time equivalent employed by the internal audit function.   
 
%IAFCert Measure of the percentage of IAF employees having at least one professional 
certification (CPA, CIA, CISA, etc.).  This variable is obtained from survey responses. 
 
IAFQAR Ordinal measure of the extent of quality assurance reviews of the IAF conducted.  
Assumes the value of ―0‖ for organizations not conducting either internal or external 
QAR, ―1‖ for organizations participating in either internal or external QAR, but not 
both, and ―2‖ for companies which have both internal and external QAR‘s conducted. 
 
IAFPlan Ordinal measure of the consideration of risk as the basis for the development of the 
IAF‘s audit plan coded as ―0‖ for a rotational, ―1‖ hybrid (rotational and risk based), and 



















Adj. for Unequal Var. 
Variable N Mean Median 
Std 









ERMADPT2 150 0.693 1.000 0.463 0.000 1.000 















2.050 10.51 0.000 






0.938 3.64 0.000 






0.073 1.86 0.066 






147 0.62 0.538 






-0.040 -1.18 0.240 






-0.019 -0.83 0.412 






-0.068 -0.79 0.432 






0.069 1.11 0.271 






0.065 3.21 0.002 






-0.073 -0.83 0.409 






0.022 0.43 0.670 






0.103 1.67 0.097 






0.106 3.49 0.001 






0.299 1.76 0.080 






1.045 2.18 0.031 






0.107 2.11 0.036 






-0.017 -0.43 0.669 
























Adj. for Unequal Var. 
Variable N Mean Median 
Std 















0.059 0.33 0.741 






0.069 2.38 0.019 






0.859 2.40 0.020 






0.537 3.19 0.002 






0.057 1.31 0.193 






0.558 3.81 0.000 












TABLE 2.3 (Panel B) – Descriptive Statistics  
ERMADPT2 Logit Model Variables (n=126) 
Variable  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Std. Dev. 
ERMADPT2 0.690 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.464 
SIZE 8.260 8.076 4.593 12.019 1.436 
LEV 0.655 0.659 0.107 1.391 0.199 
stdNI 393.616 64.578 1.469 15,664.980 1,594.941 
OPACITY 0.180 0.114 0.000 0.767 0.193 
SLACK 0.097 0.063 0.001 0.504 0.104 
GROWTH 0.109 0.063 -0.308 3.556 0.367 
∆MVE -0.380 -0.417 -0.965 0.713 0.303 
%BODInd 0.813 0.857 0.444 0.929 0.107 
CEOCOB 0.579 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.496 
ACRskAsmt 0.482 0.437 0.000 1.000 0.184 
%ACFE 0.508 0.400 0.000 1.000 0.280 
ACMem 4.040 4.000 3.000 6.000 0.916 
ACMeet 8.365 8.000 4.000 20.000 2.779 
ACMtgCEO 2.222 3.000 0.000 3.000 1.011 
COBMemAC 0.056 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.230 
lnIAFTE 2.372 2.303 0.693 5.011 0.936 
IAFTEREV  0.006 0.003 0.001 0.050 0.008 
IA-FTE 17.579 10.000 2.000 150.000 23.112 
%IAFCert 66.460 72.500 0.000 100.000 26.986 
IAFRptInd 0.562 0.524 0.000 1.000 0.196 
IAFQAR 0.913 1.000 0.000 2.000 0.877 
IAFPlan 1.516 2.000 0.000 2.000 0.547 








TABLE 2.3 (Panel C) – Descriptive Statistics - ERMADPT3 Ordered Logit Model (n=202) 
Variable  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Std. Dev. 
ERMADPT3 1.238 1.000 0.000 2.000 0.755 
SIZE 8.237 8.101 4.593 14.085 1.482 
LEV 0.683 0.682 0.107 1.457 0.217 
stdNI 346.777 67.781 0.549 15,664 1,308 
OPACITY 0.165 0.091 0.000 0.767 0.184 
SLACK 0.100 0.057 0.000 0.903 0.118 
GROWTH 0.099 0.057 -0.538 3.556 0.345 
∆MVE -0.370 -0.419 -0.976 0.713 0.318 
%BODInd 0.806 0.846 0.333 0.929 0.112 
CEOCOB 0.554 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.498 
ACRskAsmt 0.490 0.429 0.000 1.000 0.193 
%ACFE 0.510 0.400 0.000 1.000 0.290 
ACMem 4.040 4.000 3.000 8.000 1.007 
ACMeet 8.317 8.000 1.000 20.000 2.917 
ACMtgCEO 2.252 3.000 0.000 3.000 1.008 
COBMemAC 0.064 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.246 
lnIAFTE 2.324 2.197 0.000 6.215 0.985 
IAFTEREV  0.009 0.003 0.001 0.299 0.024 
IA-FTE 19.203 9.000 1.000 500.000 41.644 
%IAFCert 63.772 67.000 0.000 100.000 28.639 
IAFRptInd 0.552 0.524 0.000 1.000 0.183 
IAFQAR 0.901 1.000 0.000 2.000 0.858 
IAFPlan 1.441 1.000 0.000 2.000 0.554 








TABLE 2.3 (Panel D) – Descriptive Statistics  
ERMMTRY Ordered Logit Model Variables (n=174) 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum  Std. Dev. 
ERMMTRY 2.339 2.000 0.000 5.000 1.200 
SIZE 8.270 8.166 4.593 14.085 1.444 
LEV 0.685 0.692 0.107 1.457 0.223 
stdNI 358.640 72.724 0.627 15,664 1,370 
OPACITY 0.162 0.090 0.000 0.767 0.186 
SLACK 0.103 0.056 0.000 0.903 0.124 
GROWTH 0.106 0.060 -0.538 3.556 0.364 
∆MVE -0.372 -0.421 -0.976 0.713 0.321 
%BODInd 0.811 0.857 0.333 0.929 0.108 
CEOCOB 0.557 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.498 
ACRskAsmt 0.490 0.429 0.000 1.000 0.188 
%ACFE 0.515 0.400 0.000 1.000 0.296 
ACMem 4.040 4.000 3.000 8.000 1.005 
ACMeet 8.328 8.000 1.000 20.000 2.891 
ACMtgCEO 2.259 3.000 0.000 3.000 1.013 
COBMemAC 0.063 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.244 
lnIAFTE 2.307 2.197 0.000 6.215 0.949 
IAFTEREV  0.009 0.003 0.001 0.299 0.025 
IA-FTE 18.006 9.000 1.000 500.000 41.173 
%IAFCert 63.724 67.000 0.000 100.000 28.860 
IAFRptInd 0.548 0.524 0.000 1.000 0.177 
IAFQAR 0.897 1.000 0.000 2.000 0.861 
IAFPlan 1.466 1.000 0.000 2.000 0.545 





higher percentage of members disclosed as financial experts (%ACFE).  The results also 
provide limited evidence that the Internal Audit Functions at firms adopting ERM have 
greater reporting independence (IAFRptInd), higher budgets (lnIAFBgt), a greater 
number of staff (lnIAFTE), and were more likely to conduct quality assurance reviews of 
their functions (IAFQAR). 
Table 2.4 (Panels A – D) provides the Pearson correlation matrices for the logit 
model and ordered logit model variables.  Initial review of Table 2.4 (Panels A – D) 
provides additional initial evidence of the expected positive correlation between the three 
measures of ERM adoption (EMRADPT2, ERMADPT3) and maturity (ERMMTRY) and 
firm size and Board of Director independence as noted by prior studies.  In addition, 
several of the corporate governance measures related to the Audit Committee (%ACFE 
and ACMeet) and Internal Audit Functions (lnIAFTE, IAFQAR, and lnIAFBgt) are also 
found to have consistent significant positive correlations with the three dependent 
variable measures of ERM adoption and maturity.  Finally, both the utility (UTIL) and 
reporting independence of measure of Internal Audit Functions (IAFRptInd) were found 
to have significant positive correlations with the two measures of ERM adoption 
(ERMADPT2 and ERMADPT3).  
Table 2.5 provides the results of the logistic regressions (logit (Panel A) and ordered 
logit (Panels B and C) models) noted in equation 1. Consistent with prior research, the 
results of the base model regressions provide evidence of a positive association between 
company size (SIZE) and the percentage of board independence (%BODInd) and the 
likelihood of formal adoption (ERMADPT2 and ERMADPT3) and maturity level 






   TABLE 2.4 - (Panel A)  Correlation Table for ERMADPT2 Logit Model Variables (n=126) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) ERMADPT2 1.000 
           (2) SIZE 0.293 1.000 
          (3) LEV 0.118 0.259 1.000 
         (4) stdNI 0.033 0.247 0.174 1.000 
        (5) OPACITY -0.127 -0.126 -0.234 0.045 1.000 
       (6) SLACK -0.046 -0.122 -0.372 0.012 0.041 1.000 
      (7) GROWTH -0.078 -0.016 0.004 -0.031 0.187 -0.001 1.000 
     (8) ∆MVE 0.162 -0.014 -0.218 -0.138 0.119 -0.084 0.068 1.000 
    (9) %BODInd 0.281 0.128 -0.057 -0.035 -0.118 0.021 0.079 0.071 1.000 
   (10) CEOCOB -0.084 0.169 0.014 0.028 -0.044 -0.091 0.074 0.022 -0.071 1.000 
  (11) ACRskAsmt 0.023 0.083 0.170 0.083 -0.041 -0.066 -0.013 0.087 -0.021 0.027 1.000 
 (12) %ACFE 0.161 0.098 0.005 -0.070 -0.056 0.035 -0.062 -0.019 -0.089 -0.032 -0.125 1.000 
(13) ACMem 0.104 0.261 0.085 0.201 -0.040 -0.139 -0.023 -0.045 0.289 0.055 0.130 -0.140 
(14) ACMeet 0.157 0.179 -0.067 -0.054 0.084 0.215 -0.143 0.086 0.008 -0.004 -0.078 -0.001 
(15) ACMtgCEO 0.028 -0.057 -0.108 -0.064 0.077 -0.130 0.054 0.070 0.054 -0.035 -0.071 0.067 
(16) COBMemAC -0.062 -0.153 0.020 -0.025 -0.100 -0.045 -0.016 0.116 0.102 -0.285 0.049 -0.017 
(17) lnIAFTE 0.243 0.786 0.208 0.194 -0.131 0.019 -0.106 -0.037 0.088 0.151 0.082 0.048 
(17) IAFTEREV  -0.014 -0.197 0.204 -0.111 -0.108 -0.070 -0.103 0.105 -0.196 -0.046 0.172 -0.141 
(19) IA-FTE 0.141 0.653 0.117 0.103 -0.164 -0.004 -0.114 -0.018 0.111 0.214 0.059 -0.032 
(20) %IAFCert 0.150 -0.009 -0.112 0.128 0.098 0.032 0.037 0.112 0.226 -0.131 0.013 0.000 
(21) IAFRptInd 0.203 0.182 0.246 0.178 -0.031 -0.055 -0.023 0.014 -0.046 -0.036 0.363 -0.086 
(22) IAFQAR 0.287 0.382 0.087 0.053 -0.150 0.023 -0.059 0.119 0.150 0.025 -0.091 0.016 
(23) IAFPlan 0.004 0.008 -0.098 0.128 -0.016 0.186 0.003 -0.144 0.101 -0.049 0.034 -0.107 






TABLE 2.4 - (Panel A (continued))  Correlation Table for ERMADPT2 Logit Model Variables   (n=126) 
  
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
(1) ERMADPT2 
            (2) SIZE 
            (3) LEV 
            (4) stdNI 
            (5) OPACITY 
            (6) SLACK 
            (7) GROWTH 
            (8) ∆MVE 
            (9) %BODInd 
            (10) CEOCOB 
            (11) ACRskAsmt 
            (12) %ACFE 
            (13) ACMem 1.000 
           (14) ACMeet -0.059 1.000 
          (15) ACMtgCEO 0.129 -0.146 1.000 
         (16) COBMemAC -0.201 -0.019 -0.260 1.000 
        (17) lnIAFTE 0.251 0.187 -0.019 -0.152 1.000 
       (17) IAFTEREV  -0.061 -0.123 -0.020 0.008 -0.068 1.000 
      (19) IA-FTE 0.172 0.154 -0.031 -0.090 0.841 -0.002 1.000 
     (20) %IAFCert -0.016 0.089 -0.074 0.107 -0.097 -0.110 -0.111 1.000 
    (21) IAFRptInd 0.150 0.000 0.093 -0.081 0.122 0.203 0.074 0.018 1.000 
   (22) IAFQAR 0.084 0.010 -0.023 -0.055 0.429 0.016 0.333 -0.031 0.037 1.000 
  (23) IAFPlan 0.023 0.133 0.051 -0.039 0.091 0.024 -0.017 0.031 -0.042 0.045 1.000 






TABLE 2.4 - (Panel B)  Correlation Table for ERMADPT3 Ordered Logit Model Variables  (n=202) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) ERMADPT3 1.000 
           (2) SIZE 0.222 1.000 
          (3) LEV 0.042 0.134 1.000 
         (4) stdNI 0.042 0.275 0.097 1.000 
        (5) OPACITY -0.077 -0.118 -0.127 0.025 1.000 
       (6) SLACK -0.039 -0.176 -0.285 0.011 -0.043 1.000 
      (7) GROWTH -0.054 -0.063 0.010 -0.034 0.149 0.028 1.000 
     (8) ∆MVE 0.108 -0.029 -0.229 -0.115 0.091 0.002 0.046 1.000 
    (9) %BODInd 0.224 0.200 -0.079 0.015 -0.081 -0.019 0.048 -0.001 1.000 
   (10) CEOCOB -0.048 0.207 -0.026 0.057 -0.077 -0.079 0.050 -0.088 -0.068 1.000 
  (11) ACRskAsmt 0.004 0.110 0.096 0.088 -0.021 -0.116 -0.018 0.160 0.046 -0.037 1.000 
 (12) %ACFE 0.116 0.137 0.008 -0.017 -0.055 -0.001 -0.008 -0.104 0.029 0.016 -0.190 1.000 
(13) ACMem 0.073 0.397 0.048 0.180 -0.059 -0.178 -0.057 0.029 0.350 0.035 0.167 -0.052 
(14) ACMeet 0.119 0.159 -0.149 -0.023 0.034 0.134 -0.006 0.029 0.096 -0.012 -0.084 0.189 
(15) ACMtgCEO 0.012 -0.049 0.051 -0.068 0.052 -0.070 -0.007 0.069 0.057 -0.023 -0.047 0.015 
(16) COBMemAC -0.056 -0.119 -0.051 -0.033 -0.133 -0.030 -0.029 0.001 0.008 -0.293 0.082 -0.056 
(17) lnIAFTE 0.192 0.817 0.108 0.240 -0.088 -0.094 -0.140 -0.017 0.172 0.200 0.085 0.116 
(17) IAFTEREV  -0.039 -0.224 0.164 -0.069 -0.148 0.030 -0.038 0.100 -0.330 -0.144 0.054 -0.126 
(19) IA-FTE 0.048 0.581 0.077 0.151 -0.103 -0.047 -0.066 0.098 0.130 0.058 0.086 0.133 
(20) %IAFCert 0.138 0.065 -0.037 0.109 0.090 -0.039 -0.108 0.046 0.247 -0.138 0.099 0.056 
(21) IAFRptInd 0.184 0.042 0.201 0.091 -0.005 -0.006 -0.023 0.044 -0.096 -0.069 0.224 -0.064 
(22) IAFQAR 0.228 0.433 0.070 0.095 -0.145 -0.013 -0.136 0.063 0.223 0.071 -0.090 0.095 
(23) IAFPlan 0.046 -0.009 -0.110 0.118 0.012 0.209 0.053 -0.133 0.095 0.030 0.008 -0.051 
(24) lnIAFBud 0.180 0.457 0.022 0.170 0.034 -0.013 -0.001 0.013 0.100 0.021 0.062 0.040 





TABLE 2.4 - (Panel B (continued))  Correlation Table for ERMADPT3 Ordered Logit Model Variables   (n=202) 
  
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
(1) ERMADPT3  
            (2) SIZE 
            (3) LEV 
            (4) stdNI 
            (5) OPACITY 
            (6) SLACK 
            (7) GROWTH 
            (8) ∆MVE 
            (9) %BODInd 
            (10) CEOCOB 
            (11) ACRskAsmt 
            (12) %ACFE 
            (13) ACMem 1.000 
           (14) ACMeet -0.050 1.000 
          (15) ACMtgCEO 0.127 -0.185 1.000 
         (16) COBMemAC -0.051 -0.001 -0.206 1.000 
        (17) lnIAFTE 0.403 0.135 0.056 -0.109 1.000 
       (17) IAFTEREV  -0.094 -0.185 0.033 0.196 -0.117 1.000 
      (19) IA-FTE 0.364 0.099 -0.004 -0.061 0.675 -0.040 1.000 
     (20) %IAFCert 0.058 0.101 -0.022 0.095 -0.002 -0.203 0.015 1.000 
    (21) IAFRptInd -0.046 0.030 0.094 -0.071 -0.008 0.079 -0.050 0.051 1.000 
   (22) IAFQAR 0.195 0.080 0.041 -0.040 0.447 -0.113 0.261 0.075 0.044 1.000 
  (23) IAFPlan 0.004 0.150 0.067 0.010 0.014 -0.048 -0.047 -0.046 -0.061 0.029 1.000 
 (24) lnIAFBud 0.214 -0.004 0.085 0.005 0.537 -0.092 0.363 0.164 0.091 0.261 -0.008 1.000 





TABLE 2.4 - (Panel C)  Correlation Table for ERMMTRY Ordered Logit Model Variables  (n=174) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) ERMMTRY 1.000 
           (2) SIZE 0.245 1.000 
          (3) LEV -0.011 0.106 1.000 
         (4) stdNI 0.032 0.245 0.118 1.000 
        (5) OPACITY -0.069 -0.114 -0.119 0.043 1.000 
       (6) SLACK -0.068 -0.185 -0.282 0.011 -0.041 1.000 
      (7) GROWTH -0.161 -0.092 0.035 -0.048 0.153 0.015 1.000 
     (8) ∆MVE 0.134 -0.034 -0.207 -0.132 0.104 0.016 0.032 1.000 
    (9) %BODInd 0.229 0.122 -0.120 -0.020 -0.065 -0.023 0.023 0.020 1.000 
   (10) CEOCOB 0.020 0.202 -0.049 0.046 -0.020 -0.104 0.079 -0.063 -0.081 1.000 
  (11) ACRskAsmt 0.005 0.064 0.108 0.049 -0.003 -0.135 -0.055 0.175 0.058 0.002 1.000 
 (12) %ACFE 0.132 0.111 -0.022 -0.041 -0.063 0.005 -0.010 -0.095 0.012 -0.001 -0.204 1.000 
(13) ACMem 0.104 0.370 0.009 0.173 -0.077 -0.173 -0.067 0.054 0.348 0.036 0.162 -0.062 
(14) ACMeet 0.081 0.124 -0.162 -0.040 0.025 0.154 0.002 0.016 0.113 -0.015 -0.138 0.235 
(15) ACMtgCEO 0.065 -0.073 0.064 -0.075 0.029 -0.087 -0.016 0.072 0.088 -0.012 -0.051 0.011 
(16) COBMemAC 0.025 -0.095 -0.028 -0.029 -0.143 -0.032 -0.034 -0.002 0.013 -0.292 0.099 -0.041 
(17) lnIAFTE 0.294 0.815 0.085 0.207 -0.090 -0.103 -0.160 -0.012 0.159 0.193 0.031 0.074 
(17) IAFTEREV  -0.006 -0.218 0.151 -0.061 -0.128 0.049 -0.017 0.093 -0.341 -0.148 0.025 -0.119 
(19) IA-FTE 0.133 0.541 0.085 0.086 -0.095 -0.042 -0.077 0.103 0.100 0.027 0.029 0.120 
(20) %IAFCert 0.041 0.059 -0.007 0.109 0.071 -0.024 -0.141 0.008 0.255 -0.138 0.138 0.078 
(21) IAFRptInd 0.095 0.092 0.185 0.167 -0.032 0.024 -0.016 0.027 -0.061 -0.014 0.242 -0.048 
(22) IAFQAR 0.269 0.441 0.046 0.077 -0.136 -0.011 -0.177 0.064 0.189 0.095 -0.142 0.057 
(23) IAFPlan 0.040 0.016 -0.109 0.112 0.008 0.214 0.067 -0.112 0.117 0.039 0.002 -0.067 






TABLE 2.4 - (Panel C (continued))  Correlation Table for ERMMTRY Ordered Logit Model Variables  (n=174) 
  
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
(1) ERMMTRY 
            (2) SIZE 
            (3) LEV 
            (4) stdNI 
            (5) OPACITY 
            (6) SLACK 
            (7) GROWTH 
            (8) ∆MVE 
            (9) %BODInd 
            (10) CEOCOB 
            (11) ACRskAsmt 
            (12) %ACFE 
            (13) ACMem 1.000 
           (14) ACMeet -0.088 1.000 
          (15) ACMtgCEO 0.171 -0.193 1.000 
         (16) COBMemAC -0.010 0.011 -0.254 1.000 
        (17) lnIAFTE 0.403 0.103 0.036 -0.084 1.000 
       (17) IAFTEREV  -0.104 -0.177 0.049 0.230 -0.103 1.000 
      (19) IA-FTE 0.362 0.081 -0.028 -0.048 0.632 -0.028 1.000 
     (20) %IAFCert 0.073 0.078 -0.010 0.060 0.025 -0.182 0.021 1.000 
    (21) IAFRptInd -0.029 0.017 0.088 -0.119 0.027 0.032 0.007 0.072 1.000 
   (22) IAFQAR 0.205 0.114 0.051 -0.024 0.459 -0.113 0.253 0.080 0.076 1.000 
  (23) IAFPlan 0.008 0.145 0.095 -0.005 0.045 -0.069 -0.038 -0.045 -0.025 0.042 1.000 
 (24) lnIAFBud 0.247 -0.022 0.016 0.010 0.568 -0.095 0.353 0.131 0.098 0.245 0.060 1.000 
 
45 
(%BODInd) remains consistently significant and positive for each of the regression 
models, firm size does not remain significant for all of the regressions. Each of the panels 
in Table 2.5 attempt to provide the results in a step-wise manner for by considering the 
base model, the base model and Audit Committee characteristics, the base model and 
Internal Audit Function characteristics, the full-model which includes the base model and 
both Audit Committee and Internal Audit Function Characteristics, and finally, the base 
model with select Audit Committee and Internal Audit Function characteristics.   
While the percentage of Board of Director independence (%BODInd) remains positive 
and significant once Audit Committee and Internal Audit Function variables are added to 
the regression models, several control variables found to be significantly associated with 
ERM adoption in the base model, including size (SIZE), change in market value of equity 
(∆MVE), and duality of the CEO and Chairman of the Board positions (CEOCOB) as 
well as others found in prior studies using proxies for ERM adoption, leverage (LEV), 
earnings volatility (stdNI), opacity (OPACITY), slack (SLACK), sales growth 
(GROWTH), auditor type (BIG4), and financial industry membership, are not supported 
by these results.  Several potential explanations why such associations may not hold for 
this study exist. The first of which may be the potential noise in the dependent variable 
measures of prior studies which use Chief Risk Officer disclosure appointments or 
disclosure information as a proxy for ERM adoption.  A second consideration may be the 
timing of measurement of the control variables.  Prior studies used measures of control 
variables at points prior to the disclosure of their proxy, while tests in this study are based 
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at a similar point in time for each organization29.  An alternative consideration includes 
the possibility that the announcement of Standard & Poor‘s to begin applying Enterprise 
Risk Analysis to corporate ratings and the expansion of Enterprise Risk Analysis to non-
financial organizations may have influenced companies which differed from prior studies 
to adopt. 
Panel A of Table 2.5 uses the binary adoption dependent variable (ERMADPT2).  As 
a result of the lack of variation of respondents in the utility industry all reporting formal 
adoption, the dummy variable for utility firms (UTIL) is not included in the regression.  I 
use a one-tailed significance test based on the consistency with the predicted sign of the 
coefficient to test the variables of interest.  The regression of the base model with the 
Audit Committee variables, I find that the number of meetings (ACMeet) and the 
percentage of Audit Committee members that are financial experts to be both positive 
and significant within the model.  In adding the Internal Audit Function characteristic 
variables to the base model, the assessed level of reporting independence is the only 
Internal Audit Function (IAFRptInd) characteristic that is significant.  Using the full 
model which includes the base model and the twelve variables measuring Audit 
Committee and Internal Audit effectiveness, the number of Audit Committee meetings 
(ACMeet), percentage of disclosed financial experts (%ACFE), and independence is the 
only Internal Audit Function (IAFRptInd) remain significant with positive coefficients.  
As an additional robustness test, I regress the dependent variable on the two measures of 
Audit Committee and Internal Audit Function characteristics with the highest 
significance in the full model thereby adding the measure of the internal audit quality 
                                                             
29
 The ERMADPT2 and ERMADPT3 variables are measured at the time the survey was 




assurance review to the regression with the three test variables found to be significant in 
the full model.  The results remain consistent with the exception of the quality assurance 
measure which is significant in the reduced form regression model.  These results are 
consistent with the stated hypotheses, ERM adoption is associated with characteristics of 
the Audit Committee and Internal Audit Function, for several of the characteristics 
evaluated.   
The results of the ordered logit regression model using the dependent variable 
measure of adoption which includes informal adoption, ERMADPT3, are similar to those 
using the binary dependent variable measure; however the coefficient of membership in 
the utility industry is positive and significant while the coefficients of the Audit 
Committee meeting (ACMeet)
30
 and Internal Audit Function quality assurance review 
variables are not significant in the full or reduced form model regressions.   
Finally, given that no two ERM processes are the same, I examine the prior set of 
regressions to determine if any variables of prior research or those hypothesized in this 
study are associated with the assessed stage of ERM process maturity (ERMMTRY).  
The coefficient of percentage of Board of Director independence continues to remain 
positive and significant; however membership in the utility industry is not consistent with 
that of the regression of the three value dependent variable regression (ERMADPT3).  In 
addition, it is worth noting that the coefficient of the financial industry dummy variable is 
negative and significant which could potentially be as a result respondents low balling 
their organizations ERM process maturity based on recent failures in the financial   
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 Desender and Lafuente Gonzalez (2009) also failed to find evidence of a significant 







TABLE 2.5 – (Panel A) Logit Regression - Dependent Variable = ERMADPT2 
ERMADPT2 = f{ SIZE, LEV, stdNI, OPACITY, SLACK, GROWTH, ∆MVE, %BODInd, CEOCOB, 
BIG4, FIN, UTIL, ACCharacteristics, IAFCharacteristics} 
SIZE 0.365 0.267 0.228 0.398 0.153 
 
(0.031) (0.334) (0.213) (0.160) (0.437) 
LEV 1.973 2.189 1.704 2.521 1.302 
 
(0.109) (0.172) (0.208) (0.085) (0.325) 
stdNI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.840) (0.647) (0.642) (0.283) (0.981) 
OPACITY -0.341 -0.715 -0.606 -0.452 -0.38 
 
(0.765) (0.586) (0.625) (0.709) (0.757) 
SLACK 1.267 0.262 -0.588 1.612 -0.552 
 
(0.572) (0.927) (0.813) (0.540) (0.829) 
GROWTH -0.738 -0.46 -0.45 -0.701 -0.422 
 
(0.171) (0.433) (0.421) (0.219) (0.472) 
∆MVE 1.629 1.701 1.544 1.827 1.336 
 
(0.039) (0.071) (0.066) (0.043) (0.114) 
%BODInd 6.139 6.882 7.764 5.524 7.142 
 
(0.003) (0.010) (0.001) (0.018) (0.002) 
CEOCOB -0.603 -0.612 -0.704 -0.581 -0.54 
 
(0.168) (0.275) (0.154) (0.240) (0.260) 
BIG4 0.544 0.677 0.554 0.812 0.65 
 
(0.478) (0.481) (0.507) (0.352) (0.420) 
FIN 0.467 0.461 0.926 0.040 0.517 
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-0.099 
 
    
(0.827) 
 Constant -7.775 -14.904 -10.155 -12.651 -11.01 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Observations 148 135 148 135 148 
Pseudo_R-squared 0.17 0.3 0.23 0.25 0.27 
Chi2 31.475 50.087 41.729 42.136 48.042 
Prob_>Chi2 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: White Heteroskedastic Standard Errors used to calculate p- values in parentheses.   
Significant coefficients and p-values of control variables noted in italics. Significant coefficients  










TABLE 2.5 - (Panel B) - Ordered Logit Regression - Dependent Variable = ERMADPT3 
ERMADPT3 = f{ SIZE, LEV, stdNI, OPACITY, SLACK, GROWTH, ∆MVE, %BODInd, CEOCOB, 
BIG4, FIN, UTIL, ACCharacteristics, IAFCharacteristics} 
SIZE 0.207 0.236 0.188 0.101 0.126 
 
(0.040) (0.103) (0.085) (0.555) (0.252) 
LEV 0.335 0.267 0.413 0.085 0.119 
 
(0.574) (0.695) (0.497) (0.898) (0.847) 
stdNI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.716) (0.949) (0.590) (0.739) (0.766) 
OPACITY -0.066 -0.732 -0.145 -0.675 -0.164 
 
(0.928) (0.388) (0.849) (0.402) (0.827) 
SLACK 0.656 -0.216 0.393 -0.113 0.337 
 
(0.554) (0.862) (0.730) (0.925) (0.766) 
GROWTH -0.328 -0.206 -0.379 -0.088 -0.269 
 
(0.400) (0.641) (0.327) (0.846) (0.491) 
∆MVE 0.64 1.001 0.717 0.736 0.566 
 
(0.134) (0.039) (0.103) (0.110) (0.197) 
%BODInd 3.207 3.116 3.359 2.758 2.921 
 
(0.005) (0.024) (0.006) (0.035) (0.014) 
CEOCOB -0.204 -0.248 -0.213 -0.208 -0.147 
 
(0.435) (0.412) (0.445) (0.464) (0.581) 
BIG4 0.117 0.201 0.028 0.282 -0.073 
 
(0.794) (0.686) (0.952) (0.562) (0.874) 
FIN 0.456 0.436 0.469 0.359 0.281 
 





















TABLE 2.5-(Panel B (continued))-Ordered Logit Regression 
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0.114 
 
    
(0.656) 
 
Observations 244 223 244 223 244 
Pseudo_R-squared 0.050  0.100  0.060  0.090  0.080  
Chi2 24.801 48.461 30.664 39.866 38.233 
Note: White Heteroskedastic Standard Errors used to calculate p- values in parentheses.   
Significant coefficients and p-values of control variables noted in italics. Significant coefficients  
and p-values of for hypothesized variables noted in bold.
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TABLE 2.5 - (Panel C) - Ordered Logit Regression- Dependent Variable = ERMMTRY 
ERMMTRY = f{ SIZE, LEV, stdNI, OPACITY, SLACK, GROWTH, ∆MVE, %BODInd, CEOCOB, 
BIG4, FIN, UTIL, ACCharacteristics, IAFCharacteristics} 
SIZE 0.304 0.288 0.305 0.169 0.07 0.215 
 
(0.002) (0.043) (0.005) (0.007) (0.687) (0.043) 
LEV 0.466 0.103 0.536 0.439 0.01 0.385 
 
(0.458) (0.880) (0.402) (0.220) (0.988) (0.546) 
stdNI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.910) (0.949) (0.899) (0.958) (0.859) (0.888) 
OPACITY -0.612 -0.322 -0.481 -0.284 -0.584 -0.523 
 
(0.409) (0.694) (0.532) (0.519) (0.462) (0.484) 
SLACK 0.249 -0.462 0.356 0.394 -0.758 -0.012 
 
(0.837) (0.730) (0.780) (0.561) (0.551) (0.992) 
GROWTH -0.966 -0.71 -0.994 -0.641 -0.614 -0.904 
 
(0.017) (0.091) (0.015) (0.010) (0.151) (0.028) 
∆MVE 0.713 0.91 0.761 0.505 0.831 0.659 
 
(0.100) (0.059) (0.089) (0.049) (0.073) (0.134) 
%BODInd 2.61 3.11 2.605 1.511 2.87 2.296 
 
(0.034) (0.040) (0.047) (0.046) (0.044) (0.068) 
CEOCOB 0.118 0.112 0.253 0.153 -0.058 0.141 
 
(0.657) (0.709) (0.371) (0.346) (0.837) (0.602) 
BIG4 -0.576 -0.448 -0.682 -0.389 -0.343 -0.764 
 
(0.250) (0.410) (0.182) (0.166) (0.523) (0.131) 
FIN -0.726 -0.729 -0.76 -0.497 -0.67 -0.874 
 
(0.066) (0.092) (0.060) (0.037) (0.120) (0.032) 
ACMem 
 
-0.078 -0.067 -0.017 
  
  
(0.637) (0.666) (0.850) 
  ACMeet 
 




(0.892) (0.426) (0.394) 
 
(0.627) 
Note: White Heteroskedastic Standard Errors used to calculate p- values in parentheses.  Significant 
coefficients and p-values of control variables noted in italics. Significant coefficients and p-values of for 
hypothesized variables noted in bold. 
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TABLE 2.5 - (Panel C (continued)) - Ordered Logit Regression - Dependent Variable = ERMMTRY 
%ACFE 
 









0.710 0.484 0.252 
  
  
(0.218) (0.383) (0.432) 
  ACRskAsmt 
 
0.011 -0.068 -0.156 
  
  
(0.989) (0.927) (0.713) 
  ACMtgCEO 
 
0.108 0.123 0.083 
  
  
(0.479) (0.385) (0.303) 






















    
  
(0.798) 






























    
0.449 
 
     
(0.104) 
 Observations 206 191 206 206 191 206 
Pseudo_R-squared 0.050  0.070  0.050  0.060  0.060  0.060  
Chi2 30.302 38.766 34.394 38.289 37.725 37.785 
Note: White Heteroskedastic Standard Errors used to calculate p- values in parentheses.  Significant 
coefficients and p-values of control variables noted in italics. Significant coefficients and p-values of for 
hypothesized variables noted in bold. 
 
industry segment. Only the coefficients of the Audit Committee (%ACFE) and Internal 
Audit Function (IAFRptInd and IAFQAR) characteristics are positive and significant, 
these results don‘t hold through for each of the regressions.   
Consistent with preliminary univariate tests of mean difference between adopters and 
non-adopters (ERMADPT2), the coefficient of the percentage of financial experts on the 
audit committee (%ACFE) and the independence of the Internal Audit Function reporting 
(IAFRptInd) are significant in all three of the full regression models.   
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Taken together, these results provide support of the association between Audit 
Committee and Internal Audit Function corporate governance factors related and 
adoption and maturity of ERM processes.   
2.6 CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Although the study does have potential limitations as a result of sample size, potential 
for response bias, and a limited point in time view (fiscal year 2008), the use of a survey 
instrument should provide a more accurate measure of ERM adoption and process 
maturity measures.  In addition, the study contributes to the literature by considering the 
association of several characteristics of corporate governance factors (more specifically 
Audit Committee and Internal Audit Function characteristics) with ERM adoption and 
assessed ERM process maturity.  Although this study does identify significant positive 
associations between the number of audit committee meetings (ACMeet), percentage of 
audit committee members disclosed as financial experts (%ACFE), reporting 
independence of the Internal Audit Function (IAFRptInd) and Internal Audit Function 
quality assurance review practices (IAFQAR) and ERM adoption and process maturity, 
extended work in this area may be beneficial in providing additional information to be 
used by financial analyst, investors, creditors, suppliers, and regulators as a valuable 
signal for the consideration of investment, relationship, and compliance decisions by such 
critical stakeholders. 
The COSO ERM Integrated Framework (2004) identifies four objectives, Strategy, 
Operations, Reporting, and Compliance.  Provided that companies which adopt ERM 
focus on these four objectives, future research may consider several associated benefits of 
adoption including reduced occurrences of restatements, material weaknesses, and fraud 
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and the impact on audit fees.  Other potential research in the area of ERM may include an 
examination of whether operating and market performance benefits exist for companies 
adopting ERM.  A final area for future research should also consider whether the 
independence of the ERM reporting relationship is associated with differences of the 






AN EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF ENTERPRISE RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
 
Abstract: The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of the Treadway 
Commission in 2004 released the COSO-Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) framework 
(COSO-ERM).  COSO indicated that the development of an enterprise-wide risk 
assessment and management process is designed to ―provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the achievement of entity objectives.‖  Based on this, the companies which 
have implemented and mature Enterprise Risk Management processes in place should 
achieve greater operational and market based performance than those which have not.  
Using surveys of Internal Audit Function management, this study to my knowledge is the 
first to use a panel data approach to evaluate expected long-term benefits of ERM 
implementation based on assessed maturity of ERM processes. As opposed to using a 
proxy for ERM adoption or process maturity, this study uses survey responses from 
Internal Audit Function management to identity whether ERM has been adopted by an 
organization.  Combining survey responses with archival data, this study provides a better 
understanding of operational and market performance benefits of ERM adoption.  The 
results of the study do not find consistent support for the hypotheses that companies with 
higher assessed levels of ERM process maturity yield better operating or market 
performance. This lack of consistent support of the proposed hypotheses may be the 
result of limited sample size and power of tests, the length of lag between process 
maturity and identification of significant operational and market benefits, and limitations 





The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of the Treadway Commission 
defines Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) as an enterprise-wide risk assessment and 
management process designed to ―provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of entity objectives.‖  Provided that one of the main objectives of most 
companies is to make a profit and provide value to shareholders, this definition of ERM 
suggests that companies implementing such processes should be more likely to achieve 
enhanced operational and market performance. 
Previous studies have used CRO appointments as a proxy for ERM and have only 
considered limited benefits of ERM (stock price and earnings volatility).  This study 
attempts to extend the current understanding of benefits associated with ERM 
implementation through the use of a more reliable measure of ERM adoption including 
the stage of implementation (Beasley et al. 2005).  This study also attempts to evaluate 
additional potential operational (ROA and ROE) and market value (MVE) performance 
benefits which may be associated with ERM adoption and the maturity of the ERM 
processes.   
Rather than rely on publicly available CRO appointment data which may not 
specifically indicate whether and to what extent an organization has implemented ERM, 
this study uses responses gathered from surveys of Internal Audit Function (IAF) 
management to more identify companies which have implemented ERM and the timeline 
of the maturity of ERM processes.  Potential benefits of ERM implementation 
(operational and market performance) are evaluated using both cross-sectional and panel 
data models comprised of IAF survey-based data matched with financial and market 
performance information from the Compustat and the CRSP databases respectively.  The 
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results of the study provide additional information and considerations to management and 
company boards regarding potential benefits associated with ERM adoption.  
The next section contains a review of prior literature related to ERM benefits as well 
as studies associated with various operational and market performance measures, 
followed by development and formal identification of the research hypotheses.  The 
research methodology and data are discussed in the forth section followed by the 
conclusions and contributions of the study.   
3.2 PRIOR RESEARCH 
Although various definitions of ERM exist, one of the most prevalent is published in 
the Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework published by the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of the Treadway Commission (COSO-ERM) which 
defines ERM as: 
… a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other 
personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to 
identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within 
its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of 
entity objectives. 
The COSO-ERM Integrated Framework indicates that in order for management to 
maximize firm value, it must develop the organizations "strategy and objectives to strike 
an optimal balance between growth and return goals and related risks, and efficiently and 
effectively deploy resources in pursuit of the entity‘s objectives.‖  In fulfilling 
organizational objectives, the COSO-ERM Framework indentifies six capabilities which 
ERM encompasses:  a) Aligning risk appetite and strategy, b) Enhancing risk response 
decisions, c) Reducing operational surprises and losses, d) Identifying and managing 
multiple and cross-enterprise risks, e) Seizing Opportunities, and f) Improving 
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deployment of capital.  Each of these six capabilities can be mapped into the COSO-
ERM Integrated Framework definition.   
Despite being frequently used interchangeably with (Financial) Risk Management 
(insurance and hedging), ERM not only considers the impact of financial risk, but also 
takes into account strategic, operational, reporting, and compliance risks.  As risks within 
each of these classifications could potentially impact other areas of risk, ERM considers 
the extent to which each risk is integrated into other objectives, thereby increasing or 
decreasing risk throughout subsidiaries, business units, divisions, or the entire entity.  
Detailed information relating to risks identified through the ERM process is used to 
evaluate the level of risk, identify appropriate risk responses, implement appropriate 
control procedures, and continuously monitor and communicate the updated likelihood 
and impact of the risk not only within departments or specific divisions, but throughout 
the entire organization. 
Benefits of Implementing ERM 
Implementing ERM requires a significant investment by organizations; however the 
benefits of operational effects including decreased costs and increased revenues are not 
always readily identifiable.  Using the appointment of Chief Risk Officers (CRO) as a 
proxy for the implementation of an ERM process, Pagach and Warr (2008) find that 
companies adopting ERM experience a reduction in the volatility of stock price and 
earnings.  Beasley et al. (2007) also find that the market response to ERM adoption, as 
proxied by CRO appointment, is firm specific.  
Tonello (2007) contends that an effective ERM implementation considers the 
consequences of downside risk (negative consequences of events) and methods for 
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mitigating or avoiding such risk, as well as identification and analysis of upside risk 
frequently referred to as opportunities.  As opposed to only using a traditional risk 
management process and focusing only on downside risk, Tonello (2007) suggests that 
ERM attempts to balance (optimize) the two risk sets which may lead to cost reductions 
through the increased integration of risk assessment and management, thereby leading to 
more profitable investment decisions resulting from a more objective basis for resource 
allocation.  These cost reductions and improved investment decisions increase firm cash 
flows and can provide additional operational benefits.  Consistent with Pagach and Warr 
(2008), Tonello (2007) suggests that benefits of balancing the combination of risk sets 
include less volatile earnings which are associated with less stock price volatility and 
reductions in the cost of capital.  In addition, Lam (2001) suggests that organizations 
should be able to ―reduce losses and earnings volatility‖ and improve return on capital 
and shareholder value by implementing ERM.   
Rezaee indicates that the ability to quantify organizational risks provides management 
an opportunity to evaluate the six ―premises and capabilities‖ of the COSO ERM 
Framework indicated above (Rezaee 2009, 183-4). By addressing these six COSO-ERM 
Integrated Framework premises, organizations should be more likely to achieve increased 
earnings by actively managing risk and improving planned responses to threats and 
opportunities.  Provided that operational performance leads to increased market 
performance, I also expect ERM adoption and the stage of adoption to be positively 




Operational Performance Measures 
Prior studies have found differences or changes in organizational characteristics to be 
associated with changes in operational performance measures (e.g. ROA and ROE).  Lie 
(2005) notes improvements in operational and market performance for firms which 
follow through on their announced intent to repurchase shares on the open market.  
Alternatively, Loughran and Ritter (1997) note that firms conducting seasoned equity 
offerings frequently outperform similar sized growth firms and industry adjusted average 
operating measures (ROA and ROE) leading up to the offering, only to underperform 
these two control groups following the seasoned offering.  Core et al. (2006) find that 
firms with greater shareholder rights outperform (based on industry adjusted ROA) firms 
with lesser shareholder rights.  More recently and more closely related to this study, 
Brown and Caylor (2008) find that enhanced governance, as proxied by their 
Governance-Score measure (Gov-Score), is positively associated with industry adjusted 
measures of ROA or ROE.  This study attempts to build on these findings in considering 
the relationship between ERM and operational performance.   
Market Performance Measures 
Firm risk is a key component of both the demand for shares as well as the price of the 
firm‘s equity.  The COSO-ERM framework identifies four broad risk categories which 
the framework attempts to provide focus; strategic, operations, reporting, and compliance 
risk.  While not specific to COSO-ERM, prior research has considered variables 
associated with these four risk categories and their association with firms‘ market value 
of equity (MVE).  Considering organizations compliance with the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendment, Hughes (2000) finds that firms in violation of the act suffer a 16 percent 
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share price decrease resulting from un-booked estimated liabilities for potential penalties.  
Consistent with Hughes (2000), Clarkson et al. (2004) find evidence that capital 
expenditures in excess of the cost of mere environmental compliance are value relevant 
in the paper and pulp industry.  Consistent with this finding, Wang and Smith (2008) find 
that corporate reputation (proxied by listing on Fortunes ―America‘s Most Admired 
Company‖ listing) is associated with higher market value of equity than those considered 
to have a less favorable corporate reputation.  Amir and Lev (1996) find another 
nonfinancial growth measure (POPS – company‘s of population serviced in licensed 
area) in the wireless communications industry is value relevant.  Consistent with these 
value relevant nonfinancial measures, this study evaluates the association of ERM 
adoption and process maturity as another potential nonfinancial measure that is of value 
relevance.  
Reporting Independence 
One of the key recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) on Improving 
the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (1999) is the staffing of independent 
audit committees to help provide objective oversight of risk, control, and financial 
reporting.  Due to the potential of conflicts of interest, functional reporting independence 
of the Internal Audit Function (IAF) to the Audit Committee has been recommended by 
the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) as a corporate governance best practice within the 
standards for the practice of internal auditing.  The IIA‘s definition of internal auditing 
indicates that risk assessment is one of the primary responsibilities of the IAF.  Pagach 
and Warr (2007) find that the adoption of ERM is sensitive to the CEO‘s equity at risk.  
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In contrast, Lam (2001) indicates that Chief Risk Officers (CROs) reporting to CEO‘s are 
more effective as a result of the direct reporting line.   
3.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
COSO-ERM, Lam (2001), Tonello (2005), and many others suggest that effective 
risk management should lead to enhanced operational and market performance.  Despite 
these explicit predictions that effective ERM implementation should lead to 
improvements in return on capital, to my knowledge, prior research has not empirically 
considered the influence that ERM adoption may have on operational performance.  In 
addition, while prior studies have considered market performance in the form of 
abnormal returns associated with the appointment of a CRO, and variability of stock 
price, I am not aware of any studies which consider the influence which the maturity of 
ERM processes may have on a firm‘s market value of equity. 
Operational Performance Benefits 
Improving the deployment of capital, the sixth premise of the COSO-ERM 
Framework, suggests that ERM adoption should increase the return on capital (assets and 
equity).  Based on this consideration, companies implementing ERM should be 
associated with higher ROA and ROE than companies which have not implemented 
ERM.  Furthermore, organizations which have more mature or advanced ERM activities 
should also experience higher returns (ROA and ROE) than those which are in earlier 
stages or have not adopted ERM practices.  These considerations lead to the first 
hypothesis stated in the alternative form: 
Hypothesis 1 - Companies reporting greater ERM process maturity realize 





Market Performance Benefits 
Adoption of ERM has been found by prior studies to be associated with decreased 
earnings and stock price volatility (Tonello 2007; Pagach and Warr 2008).  Affleck-
Graves et al. (2002) has shown that decreased earnings volatility leads to lower 
transaction costs and therefore a lower cost of capital that translates to a potential higher 
market value.  In addition, provided evidence is found to support the positive relationship 
between ERM adoption and return on capital as indicated by COSO-ERM and posited by 
the first hypothesis of this study; increased operational performance should be reflected 
in stock market performance.  Consistent with Affleck-Graves et al. (2002), I expect that 
the decreased earnings volatility associated with ERM adoption to lead to higher MVE.  
This leads to the second hypothesis stated in the alternative form: 
Hypothesis 2 - Companies reporting greater ERM process maturity experience an 
increase in the market value of equity. 
Differential Benefits of ERM Function Independence 
While board influence may override the CEO‘s ability to resist ERM adoption, the 
reporting relationship of the ERM function may be influenced and yield differing 
operational and market performance benefits based on the ERM functions independence 
and reporting structure.  This leads to the final hypothesis of this study stated in the 
alternative form: 
Hypothesis 3 - Operational and market performance benefits of companies 
reporting greater ERM process maturity are moderated based on the independence 








This study uses a unique data set obtained via web-based survey of IAF management 
of U.S.-based publicly traded firms.  Survey responses were then matched to financial 
statement data related to operational performance obtained from Compustat database and 
market valuation data obtained via the CRSP database.  Benefits associated with ERM 
implementation (operational and market performance) are evaluated using panel data 
models for the three year period for fiscal years 2006 through 2008.
1
 
Information related to the adoption and maturity of ERM processes is rarely 
publically disclosed.
2
  Most prior studies use the announcement of CRO appointment as a 
proxy for ERM adoption.  ERM processes take multiple years to implement and mature; 
therefore, the timing of ERM implementation creates difficulties matching ERM 
implementation with the expected period of operational and market performance benefits.  
These considerations lead to potential noise in the data of prior ERM studies which this 
study attempts to reduce and control for by obtaining survey responses from Internal 
Audit Function management regarding whether the company has specifically 
implemented ERM and if so the stage of maturity of the implementation for fiscal years 
2006 through 2008.   
 
 
                                                             
1
 At the time of data gathering, Financial Statements data was not available for Companies 
with 2009 fiscal year ends occurring after August 30, 2009.  Once this data becomes available, 
additional analysis could be performed by including fiscal year 2009 into the analysis. 
 
2 
As of March 1, 2010, the SEC now requires organizations to discuss the Board of Directors 
oversight of risk within the organization.  Although within this disclosure some organizations 
may or may not state that ERM has been implemented, there are no specific requirements to do so 




ERM Operational Performance Model 
Following the model provided by Brown and Caylor (2008), I test the association 
between measures of the maturity of ERM processes (ERMMTRY) and two measures of 
industry adjusted operational performance; Return on Assets (IndAdjROA) and Return 
on Equity (IndAdjROE).  While prior studies have considered some of the benefits of 
ERM adoption (EPS and the volatility of EPS (Lam 2001)), studies relying on the 
disclosure of CRO appointments do not take into account the lengthy and variable period 
of time which implementation of ERM processes occur.
3
   
The COSO ERM Integrated Framework specifically references ―Improving 
deployment of capital‖ as one of the potential benefits of ERM adoption.  Applying the 
base model used by Brown and Caylor (2008), using separate models, I evaluate the 
association between operational performance measures (IndAdjROA and IndAdjROE) 
and test variables of interest which measures the assessed level of strategic, operational, 
and overall ERM processes maturity (ERMStrat, ERMOps, ERMOvr).  A measure of the 
reporting independence for the ERM function (ERMInd
4
) is also included in regressions 
through interaction with the assessed level of maturity.  The variables of interest include 
both firms that have and have not adopted ERM processes thereby providing a natural 
control of differing firms.  In addition, control variables are included for growth (book to 
market), size (market value of equity), and the lag of the dependent variable measure 
                                                             
3
 A lag year analysis is conducted to test to for the potential lag of adoption with the 
hypothesized operational performance benefits. 
 
4
 ERM reporting independence measure is measured at only one point in time. The lack of 
variance in the measure between years prevents it from being used as a stand-alone independent 





(IndAdjROA or IndAdjROE).  The following model includes these modifications to the 
Brown and Caylor (2005) base model to evaluate hypothesized benefits associated with 
ERM implementation: 
IndAdjROA (ROE) i,t = α1 + β1ROA (ROE) i,t-1 + β2lnBKMKTi,t + β3BETA + 
β4ERMMSR i,t + β5ERMMSRi,t*ERMInd  +ε                                         (1) 
where the dependent variables and hypothesized independent variables of primary 
interest are defined as: 
ROAi,t-1 - defined as income before extraordinary items (Compustat Annual Data 
Item 18) divided by total assets (Compustat Annual Data Item 6). 
 
IndAdjROAi,t - Industry Adjusted ROA – defined as the difference between firm 
i‘s ROA and the mean average ROA of available firms (minimum of 5 
firms) within the same Fama and French industry classification as firm i, 
at time t. 
 
ROEi,t-1 - defined as income before extraordinary items available for common 
equity (Compustat Annual Data Item 237) divided by the sum of the book 
value of equity (Compustat Annual Data Item 60) and deferred taxes 
(Compustat Annual Data Item 74). 
 
IndAdjROEi,t - Industry Adjusted Return on Equity – defined as the difference 
between firm i‘s ROE and the mean average ROE of available firms 
(minimum of 5 firms) within the same Fama and French industry 
classification as firm i, at time t. 
 
ERMMSRi,t - one of three measures (ERMOvr, ERMStrat, ERMOps) of the ERM 
process maturity level assessed on a six-point ordinal scale by survey 
respondents assuming one of the following six values defined by CoBIT: 
The value of 5, for ―Optimized‖; 4, for ―Managed and Measurable‖; 3, for 
―Defined Process‖; 2, for ―Repeatable but Intuitive‖; 1, for 
―Initial/Adhoc‖; and 0, for ―Non-Existent‖ ERM processes.
5
 
 ERMOvri,t - ERM Overall is a measure of the survey respondents rating of 
the overall ERM maturity based on a six point scale provided above.   
                                                             
5
 Expanded definitions of the stage of ERM process activities were included in the survey as 
a measure of the maturity of the ERM adoption.  The descriptions used in the survey for these six 
classifications (adopted from CoBIT) are as follows: 5 - Optimized – Good processes are 
followed and automated; 4 - Managed and Measureable – Processes are monitored and measured; 
3 - Defined Process – Processes are documented and communicated; 2 - Repeatable but Intuitive 
– Processes follow a regular pattern; 1 - Initial/Adhoc – Processes are ad hoc and disorganized; 0 
- Non-existent – Management processes are not applied at all. 
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 ERMStrat i,t, - ERM Strategy is a measure of the survey respondents 
assessed rating of the maturity of ERM processes related to Strategic risk 
based on a six point scale provided above. 
 ERMOps i,t, - ERM Operations is a measure of the survey respondents 
assessed rating of the maturity of ERM processes related to Operational 
risk during year t based on a six point scale provided above. 
 
ERMRPT - ERM function reporting structure based on survey question regarding 
to whom the ERM function reports.  Computed as the ratio of score of the 
extent of reporting to the audit committee and board to the score of all 
reporting relationships identified (CEO, CFO, Legal, Audit Committee, 
Board of Directors). 
 
with control variables defined as:  
lnBKMKT i,t – natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio – natural logarithm 
of the sum of the book value of equity (Compustat Annual Data Item 60) 
and deferred taxes (Compustat Annual Data Item 74) divided by the 
market value of equity (Compustat Annual Data Item 199* Compustat 
Annual Data Item 25). 
 
lnMVE i,t – the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (Compustat 
Annual Data Item 199* Compustat Annual Data Item 25). 
 
The model is also tested using the one-year lagged values of ERMMSR and the interaction of 
the ERMMSRs with ERMRPT.  ERMInd was only measured at the point of the survey, therefore 
only one year of data (survey period) is available for this variable which remains constant for 
firms. 
ERM Market Performance Model 
The markets perceived value of a firm is captured by the firms market value of equity 
(MVE), calculated as the product of the number of outstanding shares of the firms‘ 
common stock and the stock price at a given point in time.  Consistent with Matolcsy and 
Wyatt (2008), I calculate the MVE three months after the fiscal year close date of each 
firm.  Using this calculation of MVE, I follow the basic Ohlson (1995) valuation model 
with the addition of the hypothesized variables of interest to test whether the maturity of 
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ERM processes (ERMMSR) or the interaction of ERM process maturity and the ERM 
reporting structure (ERMRPT) is associated with higher values of MVE: 
MVEi,t = β1BVE i,t-1 + β2EARNi,t + β3BETA + β4ERMMSR i,t  
 + β5ERMMSRi,t*ERMInd +ε            (2) 
 
where the independent variables of primary interest to the proposed hypotheses are 
defined above, and the dependent variables and control variables are defined as: 
 
MVEi,t – is the market value of equity for firm i three months after the fiscal year-
end t (Matolcsy and Wyatt, 2008); calculated as the product of the stock 
price of firm i, and the number of common shares outstanding three 
months following the fiscal year close date (t) denoted in millions 
(obtained from CRSP database).  
 
BVEi,t-1 – Book value of equity for firm i at the prior year-end date (t-1; beginning 
of period book value) presented in millions (Compustat item 60).  
 
EARNi,t – Earnings is defined as the net income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations presented in millions (Compustat Annual Data 
Item 18 + Compustat Annual Data Item 66). 
 
3.5 RESULTS 
An on-line survey was sent via email to 1,631 Internal Audit Function management 
level employees throughout the U.S. and other countries identified via web-based key 
word searches for IAF management titles.
6
  The survey and follow-up requests were 
emailed between July and October 2010.  As presented in the Table 3.1 (Panel A) - 
Sample Description, despite receiving 496 survey responses (30.4 percent response rate), 
only 146 were U.S.-based publicly traded companies with complete responses regarding 
ERM adoption and maturity of ERM related processes information necessary for this 
study which were able to be matched to Compustat and CRSP data.  Panel B of Table 3.1 
provides an overview of the number of sample responses classified according to the Fama 
                                                             
6
 Keyword searches focused on Internal Audit Function titles including ―Chief Audit 
Executive‖, ―CAE‖, ―Vice President of Internal Audit‖, ―Internal Audit Vice President‖, 




and French Industry Classification.  Fama and French Industry classifications comprising 
the largest percentage of survey responses include transportation (9%), utilities (7%), 




TABLE 3.1 (Panel A): Sample Selection 
Total Companies Surveyed 
 
1,631 
   Total Survey Responses 
 
496 






Companies without ERM Response (for all 3 fiscal years) 
 
(52) 
Public Company Survey Responses 
 
257 
Potential observations per Firm Year 
 
3 
Total Possible Firm Year Observations 
 
771 
Missing ERM Maturity Rating (for a single fiscal year) 
 
(193) 
Compustat Data not Available 
 
(143) 
CRSP Data Not Available 
 
(12) 
Firms with only 1 Firm Year Observation 
 
(10) 
Total Firm Years Remaining in Sample 
 
413  
   Initial Public Company Responses 
 
257 
Companies removed due to missing information 
 
111 

































































































































































































































































































































Variable definitions of the study are provided in Table 3.2.  The descriptive statistics 
for the sample, presented in Table 3.3, provide an overview of the variables included in 
the study 
TABLE 3.2 - Variable Definitions 
ROAt  Return on Assets is measured as income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18) 
divided by total assets (Compustat #6) each measured at year t.   
IndAdjROAt  Industry Adjusted Average ROA is measured as the difference between the sample firms 
ROA in year t and the Fama and French Industry median ROA for year t.   
ROEt  Return on Equity is measured as income before extra ordinary items available for 
common equity (Compustat #237) divided by the sum of the book value of equity 
(Compustat #60) and deferred taxes (Compustat #74).   
IndAdjROEt  Industry Adjusted Average ROE is measured as the difference between the sample firms 
ROE in year t and the Fama and French Industry median ROE for year t.   
lnMktCap Market Capitalization three months after fiscal year end is computed as the product of 
shares outstanding (CRSP) and share price (CRSP) at the end of the third month 
following the fiscal year end.   
lnBKMKTt   Natural log of the Book to Market ratio, is computed as the natural log of the ratio of the 
sum of the book value of equity (Compustat #60) and deferred taxes (Compustat #74) 
divided by the market value of equity at fiscal year end (computed as the annual close 
price (Compustat #199) and common shares outstanding at year end (Compustat #25)).   
lnMVEt  Natural log of the market value of equity, is computed as the annual close price (#199) 
and common shares outstanding (Compustat #25) at year end.   
BETAt  Computed as the correlation of the monthly stock return (CRSP Returns) of the firm with 
the market return for up to 60 periods prior to the fiscal year end.   
BVEt-1  Book value of equity is measured as the book value of equity at the end of the prior fiscal 
year (Compustat #60).   
 
EARNt  Earnings is defined as the earnings before extraordinary items computed as the sum of the 
income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (Compustat #18) and 
discontinued operations (Compustat #66).   
 
ERMOvrt  ERM Overall is a measure of the survey respondents rating of the overall ERM maturity 
based on a six point scale provided below.   
 
In addition to an overall measure of ERM process maturity, the individual components of the COSO-ERM 
Framework, Strategy, and Operations were assessed by survey respondents.  The following are the 
definitions of these for variables: 
ERMStratt, ERM Strategy is a measure of the survey respondents rating of the maturity of ERM 






TABLE 3.2 - Variable Definitions (continued) 
ERMOpst,  ERM Operations is a measure of the survey respondents rating of the 
maturity of ERM processes related to Operations based on a six point 
scale provided below. 
 
Survey respondents were requested to assess the level of maturity of their organizations 
Overall, Strategic, Operations, Reporting, and Compliance ERM process on a 6 point 
ordinal scale adopted from CoBIT.  The following are the six ordinal levels used to assess 
ERM process maturity: 
0 - Non-existent - Management processes are not applied at all;. 
1 - Initial/Adhoc - Processes are ad hoc and disorganized; 
2 - Repeatable but Intuitive - Processes follow a regular pattern; 
3 - Defined Process - Processes are documented and communicated; 
4 - Managed and Measurable - Processes are monitored and measured; and 







TABLE 3.3 - Panel A - Descriptive Statistics IndAdjROA Model 
(n=515) 
Variable  Mean  Median Min.  Max. 
 Std.  
Dev. 
IndAdjROAt 0.019 0.010 -0.448 0.501 0.092 
ROAt-1 0.052 0.048 -0.504 0.537 0.083 
lnBkMkti,t -0.648 -0.626 -6.602 1.993 0.798 
lnMVEt 7.664 7.696 2.269 12.125 1.644 
ERMOvrt 1.963 2.000 0.000 5.000 1.294 
ERMStratt 1.821 2.000 0.000 5.000 1.321 
ERMOpst 1.915 2.000 0.000 5.000 1.385 








TABLE 3.3 - Panel B - Descriptive Statistics IndAdjROE Model (n=388) 
Variable  Mean  Median  Min.  Max. Std. Dev. 
IndAdjROEt 0.014 0.016 -0.812 0.910 0.181 
ROEt-1 0.114 0.107 -0.693 0.987 0.160 
lnBkMkti,t -0.681 -0.670 -3.210 1.993 0.716 
lnMVEt 7.869 7.908 3.403 12.125 1.502 
BETAt 1.004 0.876 -0.475 4.660 0.629 
ERMOvrt 1.894 2.000 0.000 5.000 1.322 
ERMStratt 1.809 2.000 0.000 5.000 1.371 
ERMOpst 1.853 2.000 0.000 5.000 1.433 







TABLE 3.3 - Panel C - Descriptive Statistics MVE Model (n=496) 
Variable  Mean  Median  Min. Max.  Std. Dev. 
MVEt+3mths 7,202,544  2,126,166  19,000  209,000,000  18,161,551  
BVEt-1      3,128      1,068  1.908              66,662         6,101  
EARNt         346          112  -5,911            11,706          1,186  
BETAt       0.981      0.862  -0.475              4.660        0.633  
ERMOvrt       1.948        2.000  0.000              5.000        1.302  
ERMStratt       1.813        2.000  0.000              5.000         1.331  
ERMOpst       1.905        2.000  0.000              5.000          1.394  





Operating Performance Models 
Panels A and B of Table 3.4 provide the Pearson correlation matrices for variables 
included in the operational performance model (model 1).
7
 Correlations between the 
Industry median adjusted average ROA and ROE, and the operational performance 
control model variables are both significant and consistent with expected directionality. 
Although not significantly correlated with industry median adjusted average ROA, the 
ERM maturity measures (ERMOvr, ERMStrat, and ERMOps) are in the direction 
hypothesized. However the correlation between ERMOvr and ERMStrat are 
unexpectedly negative though insignificant. Given the lack of control for other variables 
and consideration of linear relationships, the lack of results consistent with expectations 




TABLE 3.4 – Panel A - Pearson Correlation Matrix - IndAdjROAt Model Variables (n=515) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) IndAdjROAt 1.000 
       
(2) ROAt-1 0.371 1.000 
      
(3) lnBkMkti,t -0.416 -0.163 1.000 
     
(4) lnMVEt 0.383 0.256 -0.413 1.000 
    
(5) ERMOvrt 0.027 0.110 0.129 0.138 1.000 
   
(6) ERMStratt 0.018 0.092 0.141 0.124 0.786 1.000 
  
(7) ERMOpst 0.041 0.152 0.103 0.174 0.866 0.795 1.000 
 (8) ERMInd  0.126 0.055 -0.043 -0.066 0.099 0.035 0.081 1.000 
 
  
                                                             
7 As a result of the number of variables included in the study Table 3.3 only provides a limited panel of 






TABLE 3.4 – Panel B - Pearson Correlation Matrix - IndAdjROEt Model Variables (n=388) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) IndAdjROEt 1.000 
        
(2) ROEt-1 0.456 1.000 
       
(3) lnBkMkti,t -0.535 -0.353 1.000 
      
(4) lnMVEt 0.358 0.243 -0.491 1.000 
     
(5) BETAt -0.242 -0.105 0.191 -0.308 1.000 
    
(6) ERMOvrt -0.027 0.056 0.160 0.157 -0.072 1.000 
   
(7) ERMStratt -0.023 0.071 0.157 0.163 -0.010 0.798 1.000 
  
(8) ERMOpst 0.041 0.122 0.104 0.217 -0.136 0.873 0.855 1.000 







TABLE 3.4 – Panel C - Pearson Correlation Matrix - MVE Model Variables (n=496) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) MVEt+3mths 1.000 
       
(2) BVEt-1 0.798 1.000 
      
(3) EARNt 0.829 0.726 1.000 
     
(4) BETAt -0.115 -0.184 -0.132 1.000 
    
(5) ERMOvrt 0.078 0.196 0.073 -0.033 1.000 
   
(6) ERMStratt 0.036 0.155 0.056 0.021 0.789 1.000 
  
(7) ERMOpst 0.123 0.218 0.113 -0.102 0.872 0.817 1.000 






Industry Adjusted ROA 
As presented in Table 3.5 (Panel A, B, C, and D), the natural log of book value to 
market value (lnBKMKt), and the natural log of the market value of equity (lnMVEt) 
have a positive and significant association with the industry median adjusted ROA. The 
coefficient of the ERMMTRY01 binary indicator, in Panel A of table 3.5 is both positive 
(coefficient = 0.017) and significant (p-value = 0.066). In addition, the coefficient of the 
ERMMTRY variable is also positive (0.010) and significant (p-value = 0.044) when the 
model also includes the interaction of ERMMTRY and ERMInd. However, the 
coefficient of the interaction term is negative (-0.014) and moderately significant (p-
value=.081). Although the results of the regression do not find consistent significant 
associations between the different measures of ERMMTRY and the IndAdjROA, to fully 
support the hypothesized relationship, there is limited evidence to support of the 
hypothesis.  
The lack of significant and consistent coefficient estimates do not provide support 
that either ERM process maturity or the independence of ERM function reporting is 











TABLE 3.5 (Panel A) - PANEL DATA – IndAdjROA Model - ERMMsr = ERMOvri,t 
IndAdjROAi,t = β1ROAi,t-1  + β2 lnBkMkti,t + β3lnMVEi,t + β4ERMOvri,t + β5ERMOvri,t*ERMInd + εi,t  
ROAt-1 -0.170 -0.169 -0.171 -0.172 -0.168 -0.171 -0.170 
 
(0.155) (0.156) (0.154) (0.147) (0.159) (0.154) (0.155) 
lnBkMkti,t 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.032 
 
(0.017) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
lnMVEt t 0.078 0.079 0.078 0.08 0.079 0.078 0.079 
 















   
   
(0.683) (0.081) 
   
ERMMTRY01t 









     
-0.002 -0.008 
      
(0.683) (0.216) 
Constant -0.547 -0.562 -0.545 -0.573 -0.559 -0.545 -0.558 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 515 515 515 515 515 515 515 
Cross Sections 192 192 192 192 192 192 192 
R-squared 0.828 0.829 0.828 0.83 0.829 0.828 0.83 
Adj. R^2 0.723 0.723 0.723 0.725 0.724 0.723 0.724 
F-stat 14.347 10.889 10.74 8.914 12.063 10.74 10.062 
Note: White Heteroskedastic Standard Errors used to calculate p- values in parentheses.  Significant 
coefficients and p-values of control variables noted in italics. Significant coefficients and p-values of 









TABLE 3.5 (Panel B) - PANEL DATA – IndAdjROA Model  ERMMsr = ERMMOvri,t-1 
IndAdjROAi,t = β1ROAi,t-1 + β2lnBkMkti,t + β3lnMVEi,t + β4ERMOvri,t-1 + β5ERMOvri,t-1*ERMInd + εi,t  
ROAt-1 -0.348 -0.345 -0.342 -0.342 -0.346 -0.348 -0.347 
 
(0.033) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039) (0.036) (0.033) (0.035) 
lnBkMkti,t 0.063 0.062 0.06 0.06 0.063 0.063 0.063 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
lnMVEt 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.091 0.092 0.092 0.092 
 











   ERMOvrt-1*ERMInd 
  
0.015 0.019 
   
   
(0.347) (0.288) 
   ERMOvr01t-1 









     
0.008 0.027 
      
(0.830) (0.489) 
Constant -0.626 -0.636 -0.632 -0.626 -0.623 -0.629 -0.627 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 333 333 333 333 333 333 333 
Cross Sections 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 
R-squared 0.897 0.897 0.898 0.898 0.897 0.897 0.897 
Adj. R^2 0.778 0.777 0.778 0.777 0.776 0.776 0.775 
F-stat 7.057 5.544 6.177 5.095 5.733 6.715 5.474 
Note: White Heteroskedastic Standard Errors used to calculate p- values in parentheses.  Significant coefficients and p-values of control  






TABLE 3.5 (Panel C) - PANEL DATA – IndAdjROA Model  ERMMsr = STRATi,t 
IndAdjROAi,t = β1ROAi,t-1  + β2 lnBkMkti,t + β3lnMVEi,t + β4ERMStrati,t + β5ERMStrati,t*ERMInd  + εi,t 
ROAt-1 -0.174 -0.169 -0.17 -0.172 -0.348 -0.345 -0.346 -0.345 
 
(0.128) (0.156) (0.156) (0.149) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
lnBkMkti,t 0.033 0.03 0.032 0.031 0.063 0.062 0.062 0.062 
 
(0.013) (0.024) (0.019) (0.026) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
lnMVEt 0.082 0.079 0.078 0.079 0.092 0.093 0.092 0.093 
 











    ERMStratt*ERMInd 
  
0.000 -0.008 
    
   
(0.968) (0.300) 
    ERMStratt-1 









      
0.002 -0.005 
       
(0.848) (0.788) 
Constant -0.578 -0.562 -0.547 -0.567 -0.626 -0.638 -0.628 -0.639 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 545 515 515 515 333 333 333 333 
Cross Sections 203 192 192 192 175 175 175 175 
R-squared 0.824 0.829 0.828 0.829 0.897 0.897 0.897 0.897 
Adj. R^2 0.717 0.723 0.722 0.723 0.778 0.776 0.776 0.775 
F-stat 16.443 10.575 10.884 8.665 7.057 5.329 5.252 4.303 
Note: White Heteroskedastic Standard Errors used to calculate p- values in parentheses.  Significant coefficients  
and p-values of control variables noted in italics. Significant coefficients and p-values of for hypothesized  









TABLE 3.5 (Panel D) - PANEL DATA – IndAdjROA Model  ERMMsr = OPSi,t 
IndAdjROAi,t = β1ROAi,t-1  +β2lnBkMkti,t + β3lnMVEi,t + β4ERMOpsi,t + β5ERMOpsi,t*ERMInd + εi,t 
ROAt-1 -0.170 -0.173 -0.170 -0.175 -0.348 -0.348 -0.348 -0.348 
 
(0.155) (0.146) (0.156) (0.143) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
lnB2Mt 0.032 0.030 0.031 0.030 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 
 
(0.017) (0.024) (0.020) (0.026) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
lnMVEt 0.078 0.079 0.078 0.079 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092 
 











    ERMOpst*ERMInd 
  
0.003 -0.006 
    
   
(0.568) (0.465) 
    ERMOpst-1 









      
-0.002 -0.002 
       
(0.896) (0.891) 
Constant -0.547 -0.567 -0.551 -0.570 -0.626 -0.625 -0.625 -0.626 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 515 515 515 515 333 333 333 333 
Cross Sections 192 192 192 192 175 175 175 175 
R-squared 0.828 0.829 0.828 0.83 0.897 0.897 0.897 0.897 
Adj. R^2 0.723 0.724 0.723 0.724 0.778 0.776 0.776 0.775 
F-stat 14.347 11.149 10.844 8.853 7.057 5.534 5.28 4.577 
Note: White Heteroskedastic Standard Errors used to calculate p- values in parentheses.  Significant  
coefficients and p-values of control variables noted in italics. Significant coefficients and p-values  






Industry Adjusted ROE 
As presented in Table 3.6 (Panels A, B, C, and D), the coefficients of the lagged value of 
the unadjusted dependent variable (ROEt-1), the natural log of book value to market value 
(lnBKMKt) are not significant in the model, while those of natural log of the market 
value of equity (lnMVEt) and Beta are positive and significant in each of the the median 
industry adjusted averages models.. As a result of changes in the U.S. economic 
conditions during the period of the study, two dummy variables representing the fiscal 
year of observation are added into the overall ERM maturity model to attempt to control 
for these changes during the period and are presented in Panel B of Table 3.6. Although 
the coefficients of the measures of ERM process maturity (ERMOvr, ERMOvr01, 
ERMStrat, ERMOps) and the corresponding lags of these variables are positive for each 
model, with the exception of two models (ERMMTRYt (coef. = 0.030; p-value=0.043); 
ERMStratt (coef. 0.027; p-value = 0.059); ERMOpst  (coef. = 0.029; p-value=0.042), the 
coefficients are not statistically significant. Coefficients of the ERM maturity and ERM 
reporting independence interactions (ERMOvrt*ERMInd, ERMMTRY01t*ERMInd, 
ERMStratt*ERMInd, and ERMOpst*ERMInd) are negative and significant for all non-
lagged year models.  in the current year models. Together, the results provide limited 
support of a positive association between ERM process maturity and operational 
performance. In addition, contrary to the hypothesized benefit of ERM reporting 
independence, tests results provide initial evidence of greater benefits when ERM leader 
reports to management as opposed to the board.
38
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 The ERM reporting independence variable is only captured for one point in time, fiscal 
year 2008, therefore the interaction terms are serially correlated across periods. An extension to 
the survey which captures the reporting relationship for each year would help to reduce such any 






TABLE 3.6 (Panel A) - PANEL DATA – IndAdjROE Model ERMMsr = ERMOvri,t-1 
IndAdjROEi,t = β1ROEi,t-1 + β2 lnBkMkti,t + β3lnMVEi,t + β4Betai,t + β5ERMOvri,t + β6ERMOvri,t*ERMInd + ε,t 
ROEt-1 -0.210 -0.212 -0.218 -0.240 -0.210 -0.218 -0.225 
 
(0.211) (0.208) (0.189) (0.146) (0.212) (0.189) (0.176) 
lnBkMkti,t 0.029 0.024 0.040 0.032 0.029 0.040 0.039 
 
(0.517) (0.609) (0.413) (0.515) (0.534) (0.413) (0.427) 
lnMVEt 0.176 0.175 0.181 0.183 0.176 0.181 0.184 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BETAt 0.046 0.044 0.049 0.049 0.046 0.049 0.052 
 











   ERMOvrt*ERMInd 
 
-0.025 -0.062 
   
   
(0.102) (0.009) 
   ERMOvr01t 









    
-0.025 -0.034 
      
(0.102) (0.059) 
Constant -1.374 -1.379 -1.392 -1.441 -1.376 -1.392 -1.416 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 388 388 388 388 388 388 388 
R-squared 0.731 0.731 0.733 0.738 0.731 0.733 0.734 
Adj. R^2 0.553 0.551 0.554 0.561 0.551 0.554 0.554 
Cross Sections 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
F-stat 12.292 11.043 9.995 10.2 11.635 9.995 10.464 
Note: White Heteroskedastic Standard Errors used to calculate p- values in parentheses.  Significant coefficients and p-values of control  






TABLE 3.6 (Panel B) - PANEL DATA – IndAdjROE Model ERMMsr = ERMOvri,t-1 
IndAdjROEi,t =β1ROEi,t-1 +β2 lnBkMkti,t +β3lnMVEi,t +β4Betai,t +β5ERMOvri,t +β6ERMOvri,t*ERMInd +ε,t 
ROEt-1 -0.214 -0.214 -0.229 -0.241 -0.213 -0.229 -0.231 
 
(0.202) (0.205) (0.167) (0.147) (0.208) (0.167) (0.166) 
lnBkMkti,t 0.019 0.019 0.028 0.029 0.019 0.028 0.028 
 
(0.719) (0.714) (0.615) (0.596) (0.717) (0.615) (0.611) 
lnMVEt 0.193 0.194 0.202 0.201 0.193 0.202 0.202 
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  
BETAt 0.043 0.044 0.048 0.048 0.043 0.048 0.049 
 
(0.039) (0.042) (0.026) (0.024) (0.044) (0.026) (0.022) 
FY2006 -0.026 -0.029 -0.040 -0.023 -0.031 -0.040 -0.038 
 
(0.264) (0.323) (0.104) (0.428) (0.240) (0.104) (0.150) 
FY2007 -0.047 -0.049 -0.057 -0.045 -0.050 -0.057 -0.055 
 









   ERMOvrt*ERMInd -0.038 -0.060 
   
   
(0.023) (0.014) 
   ERMOvr01t 









   
-0.038 -0.040 
      
(0.023) (0.026) 
Constant -1.485 -1.485 -1.522 -1.545 -1.478 -1.522 -1.528 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 388 388 388 388 388 388 388 
Cross Sections 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
R-squared 0.738 0.738 0.742 0.744 0.738 0.742 0.742 
Adj. R^2 0.560 0.558 0.566 0.568 0.559 0.566 0.564 
F-stat 8.875 8.126 7.859 7.863 8.619 7.859 8.236 
Note: White Heteroskedastic Standard Errors used to calculate p- values in parentheses.  Significant 
coefficients and p-values of control variables noted in italics. Significant coefficients and p-values of for 









TABLE 3.6 (Panel C) - PANEL DATA – IndAdjROE Model ERMMsr = ERMMOvri,t-1 
IndAdjROEi,t = β1ROEi,t-1 + β2 lnBkMkti,t + β3lnMVEi,t + β4Betai,t + β5ERMOvri,t +  
β6ERMOvri,t*ERMInd + ε  
ROEt-1 -0.161 -0.169 -0.163 -0.168 -0.171 -0.170 -0.172 
 
(0.440) (0.423) (0.437) (0.428) (0.419) (0.420) (0.419) 
lnBkMkti,t 0.121 0.111 0.115 0.111 0.119 0.123 0.121 
 
(0.128) (0.163) (0.148) (0.165) (0.125) (0.114) (0.123) 
lnMVEt 0.241 0.241 0.240 0.241 0.244 0.247 0.246 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
BETAt 0.075 0.073 0.072 0.073 0.074 0.070 0.071 
 











   ERMMOvrt-1*ERMInd 
  
0.028 0.005 
   
   
(0.413) (0.895) 
   ERMMOvr01t-1 









     
0.094 0.053 
      
(0.210) (0.574) 
Constant -1.867 -1.899 -1.872 -1.896 -1.900 -1.911 -1.912 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 
R-squared 0.83 0.832 0.831 0.832 0.832 0.831 0.832 
Adj. R^2 0.610 0.609 0.608 0.605 0.609 0.609 0.606 
Cross Sections 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 
F-stat 6.531 5.385 5.238 4.658 5.556 5.429 4.699 
Note: White Heteroskedastic Standard Errors used to calculate p- values in parentheses.  Significant 
coefficients and p-values of control variables noted in italics. Significant coefficients and p-values of for 








TABLE 3.6 (Panel D) - PANEL DATA – IndAdjROE Model ERMMsr = ERMStrati,t-1 
         IndAdjROEi,t = β1ROEi,t-1 + β2 lnBkMkti,t + β3lnMVEi,t + β4Betai,t + β5ERMStrati,t + β6ERMStrati,t*ERMInd + ε,t 
ROEt-1 -0.210 -0.211 -0.217 -0.240 -0.161 -0.160 -0.161 -0.168 
 
(0.211) (0.212) (0.189) (0.147) (0.440) (0.441) (0.437) (0.423) 
lnBkMkti,t 0.029 0.027 0.046 0.038 0.121 0.122 0.128 0.124 
 
(0.517) (0.572) (0.346) (0.442) (0.128) (0.148) (0.121) (0.141) 
lnMVEt 0.176 0.176 0.183 0.185 0.241 0.241 0.242 0.245 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
BETAt 0.046 0.045 0.050 0.049 0.075 0.075 0.076 0.076 
 











    ERMStratt*ERMInd 
  
-0.034 -0.067 
    
   
(0.075) (0.010) 
    ERMStratt-1 









      
-0.033 -0.067 
       
(0.485) (0.132) 
Constant -1.374 -1.376 -1.397 -1.445 -1.867 -1.862 -1.855 -1.893 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 388 388 388 388 247 247 247 247 
Cross Sections 150 150 150 150 135 135 135 135 
R-squared 0.731 0.731 0.735 0.74 0.83 0.83 0.832 0.832 
Adj. R^2 0.553 0.551 0.558 0.564 0.61 0.606 0.609 0.607 
F-stat 12.292 10.243 10.258 9.972 6.531 5.59 5.562 4.626 
Note: White Heteroskedastic Standard Errors used to calculate p- values in parentheses.  Significant coefficients and p-values  







TABLE 3.6 (Panel E) - PANEL DATA – IndAdjROE Model ERMMsr = ERMOpsi,t-1 
IndAdjROEi,t = β1ROEi,t-1  + β2 lnBkMkti,t + β3lnMVEi,t + β4Betai,t + β5ERMOpsi,t + β6ERMOpsi,t*ERMInd + ε  
ROEt-1 -0.210 -0.217 -0.209 -0.232 -0.259 -0.256 -0.261 -0.268 
 
(0.211) (0.198) (0.211) (0.166) (0.241) (0.248) (0.238) (0.237) 
lnBkMkti 0.029 0.023 0.036 0.030 0.111 0.114 0.117 0.115 
 
(0.517) (0.628) (0.453) (0.531) (0.145) (0.156) (0.133) (0.153) 
lnMVEt 0.176 0.176 0.179 0.182 0.239 0.239 0.240 0.241 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
BETAt 0.046 0.044 0.048 0.048 0.067 0.066 0.068 0.070 
 











    ERMOpst *ERMInd 
  
-0.019 -0.054 
    
   
(0.273) (0.022) 
    ERMOpst -1 









      
-0.038 -0.057 
       
(0.422) (0.251) 
Constant -1.374 -1.390 -1.379 -1.435 -1.841 -1.828 -1.822 -1.839 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 388 388 388 388 256 256 256 256 
Cross Sections 150 150 150 150 140 140 140 140 
R-squared 0.731 0.732 0.732 0.737 0.819 0.819 0.82 0.82 
Adj. R^2 0.553 0.552 0.552 0.559 0.583 0.58 0.582 0.579 
F-stat 12.292 10.943 9.923 10.086 6.817 5.504 5.572 4.585 
Note: White Heteroskedastic Standard Errors used to calculate p- values in parentheses.  Significant coefficients and p-values of control variables  
noted in italics. Significant coefficients and p-values of for hypothesized variables noted in bold. 
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Market Valuation Model 
The correlation matrix for the Market Valuation model presented in Table 3.7 
indicates significant, though low, positive correlations between the variables of interest 
(ERMOvr, and ERMOps) and the market value of equity (MVE). In addition, the 
correlations between the control variables included in equation 2 and the market value of 
equity are significant and consistent with the expected directions, though the correlation 
of Beta is low. Additional analysis of the correlation table indicates a highly significant 
correlation (coef. = 0.726; p-value = 0.000) between the two control variables, book 
value of equity (BVEt-1) and earnings (EARNt) which is likely introduce concerns of 
multi-coliniarity within the model.  
The results of the Market Capitalization (90 days from fiscal year end (MVEi,t+3mths) 
panel data regression are provided in Table 3.8 (Panels A, B, C, D). Each model and 
several of the control variables (BVE and EARN) are significant in each model. Contrary 
to the predicated hypothesis that ERM maturity would be associated with a market value 
of equity premium, the coefficients of the ERM process maturity measures (ERMOvr, 
ERMStrat, ERMOps) are consistently negative and significant for the both the current 
year and lagged year models. These results hold when the interaction variable, which 
measures ERM reporting independence, are added to the model. , but  is not significant in 
any of the models. Despite these results, the adjusted R
2
 values, greater than .87 for each 
model, provide additional evidence of concerns of multi-colliniarity.
1
 Although the   
                                                             
1
 Additional analysis of the issue of multi-colliniarity will be further evaluated with more 






TABLE 3.7 (Panel A) - MKTVAL - ERMMsr = ERMMOvri,t  & ERMOvr01i,t  
MktCapi,t = β1BVE i,t-1 + β2EARNi,t + β3BETAi,t + β4ERMOvri,t + β5ERMOvri,t*ERMInd +ε 
BVE i,t-1 -2,212 -2,104 -2,168 -2,103 -2,169 -2,168 -2,154 -4,465 
 
(0.058) (0.067) (0.060) (0.068) (0.063) (0.060) (0.063) (0.136) 
EARNt 2,549 2,451 2,532 2,450 2,413 2,532 2,446 1,776 
 
(0.018) (0.024) (0.018) (0.024) (0.025) (0.018) (0.022) (0.048) 
BETAt -1,674,552 -1,350,691 -1,493,316 -1,351,387 -1,589,994 -1,493,316 -1,500,786 -1,446,780 
 











    ERMMOvrt*ERMInd 
 
-1,260,516 53,388 
    
   
(0.008) (0.925) 
    ERMOvr01t 










    
-1,260,516 -811,749 
 
      
(0.008) (0.123) 
 Constant 14,882,523 16,287,261 15,426,071 16,294,512 15,393,086 15,426,071 15,577,046 21,183,547 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) 
Observations 496 496 496 496 496 496 496 321 
Cross Sections 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 169 
R-squared 0.953 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.941 
Adj. R^2 0.924 0.926 0.925 0.926 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.872 
F-stat 9.481 11.086 8.544 9.392 9.707 8.544 7.867 6.484 
Note: White Heteroskedastic Standard Errors used to calculate p- values in parentheses.  Significant coefficients and p-values of control variables  









TABLE 3.7 (Panel B) - MKTVAL - ERMMsr = ERMMTRYi,t   
MktCapi,t = β1BVE i,t-1 + β2EARNi,t + β3BETAi,t + β4ERMOvri,t + β5ERMOvri,t*ERMInd +ε 
BVE i,t-1 
 
-4,446 -4,458 -4,446 -4,430 -4,430 -4,435 
  
(0.137) (0.137) (0.139) (0.141) (0.138) (0.141) 
EARNt 
 
1,691 1,704 1,687 1,695 1,591 1,593 
  
(0.055) (0.050) (0.055) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) 
BETAt 
 
-1,073,656 -1,162,285 -1,062,353 -1,351,023 -1,099,940 -1,089,246 
  









   ERMOvrt-1*ERMIND -1,792,772 -253,218 
   
   
(0.046) (0.840) 
   ERMOvr01t-1 









   
-5,627,982 -6,167,623 




22,928,685 21,904,528 22,895,443 21,525,489 21,493,837 21,447,899 
  
(0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) 
Observations 321 321 321 321 320 320 
Cross Sections 169 169 169 169 168 168 
R-squared 0.942 0.941 0.942 0.941 0.941 0.941 
Adj. R^2 
 
0.873 0.872 0.872 0.871 0.873 0.872 
F-stat 
 
7.235 5.639 6.113 5.506 6.045 5.522 
Note: White Heteroskedastic Standard Errors used to calculate p- values in parentheses.  Significant coefficients and p-values of  









TABLE 3.7 (Panel C) - MKTVAL - ERMMsr = ERMStrati,t   
MktCapi,t = β1BVE i,t-1 + β2EARNi,t + β3BETAi,t + β4ERMStrati,t + β5ERMStrati,t*ERMInd +ε 
BVE i,t-1 -2,212 -2,113 -2,178 -2,111 -4,465 -4,391 -4,442 -4,396 
 
(0.058) (0.070) (0.061) (0.072) (0.136) (0.147) (0.141) (0.146) 
EARNt 2,549 2,485 2,533 2,482 1,776 1,744 1,777 1,719 
 
(0.018) (0.023) (0.019) (0.023) (0.048) (0.053) (0.049) (0.057) 
BETAt -1,674,552 -1,429,641 -1,552,137 -1,430,606 -1,446,780 -1,131,704 -1,381,757 -1,070,784 
 











    ERMStratt*ERMInd 
  
-842,088 152,567 
    
   
(0.019) (0.771) 
    ERMStratt-1 









      
-664,400 1,692,615 
       
(0.522) (0.228) 
Constant 14,882,523  15,665,226  15,168,553  15,681,200  21,183,547  22,061,771  21,361,774  22,239,255  
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.021) (0.015) (0.021) (0.014) 
Observations 496 496 496 496 321 321 321 321 
Cross Sections 186 186 186 186 169 169 169 169 
R-squared 0.953 0.954 0.953 0.954 0.941 0.941 0.941 0.941 
Adj. R^2 0.924 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.872 0.872 0.871 0.872 
F-stat 9.481 11.328 9.201 9.024 6.484 5.953 4.838 6.842 
Note: White Heteroskedastic Standard Errors used to calculate p- values in parentheses.  Significant coefficients and p-values of control variables  









TABLE 3.7 (Panel D) - MKTVAL - ERMMsr = ERMOpsi,t  & ERMOpsi,t-1  
MktCapi,t = β1BVE i,t-1 + β2EARNi,t + β3BETAi,t + β4ERMOpsi,t + β5ERMOpsi,t*ERMInd +ε 
BVE i,t-1 -2,212 -2,086 -2,135 -2,085 -4,465 -4,313 -4,354 -4,309 
 
(0.058) (0.068) (0.063) (0.069) (0.136) (0.138) (0.136) (0.139) 
EARNt 2,549 2,486 2,502 2,484 1,776 1,682 1,698 1,676 
 
(0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.048) (0.054) (0.046) (0.052) 
BETAt -1,674,552 -1,355,361 -1,451,780 -1,347,553 -1,446,780 -1,071,436 -1,180,747 -1,062,743 
 











    ERMOpst*ERMIND 
  
-1,405,877 -253,109 
    
   
(0.022) (0.713) 
    ERMOpst-1 









      
-3,617,573 -1,096,478 
       
(0.028) (0.528) 
Constant 14,882,523 16,102,604 15,362,227 16,065,509 21,183,547 23,759,444 22,548,500 23,679,449 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) 
Observations 496 496 496 496 321 321 321 321 
Cross Sections 186 186 186 186 169 169 169 169 
R-squared 0.953 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.941 0.943 0.943 0.943 
Adj. R^2 0.924 0.926 0.925 0.926 0.872 0.877 0.875 0.876 
F-stat 9.481 10.849 8.684 9.524 6.484 8.719 7.165 8.018 
Note: White Heteroskedastic Standard Errors used to calculate p- values in parentheses.  Significant coefficients and p-values of control variables  
noted in italics. Significant coefficients and p-values of for hypothesized variables noted in bold.
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results suggest evidence to contrary to expectations of hypotheses 2 or 3, the results are 
limited as a result of the presence of independent variables with are highly correlated 
with each other.   
3.6 CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Benefits of ERM adoption considered in this study (improved industry adjusted ROA 
and ROE, and MVE) are likely to be of considerable interest to stakeholders of any 
organization. However, executive management and board of directors (and their 
committees) may have the greatest interest of benefits associated with ERM adoption as a 
result of their respective fiduciary responsibilities for management and oversight of the 
organization. Like any investment in the business, management and the board are likely 
to be interested in the operational and market performance benefits associated with the 
cost to implement and maintain an effective ERM process.   
This study contributes to the literature by providing an increased understanding of 
benefits of adopting ERM and maturity of ERM processes by using a unique data set 
obtained from survey responses provided by U.S. - based CAE‘s.  Although the result of 
the study only provides limited evidence of support of proposed hypotheses, several 
limitations may have contributed to the lack of positive and consistent results. The small 
sample size, and lack of multi-year direct measure of ERM reporting independence, and 
multi-collinarity of data each create a limitation to adequately evaluating the results of 
the study. Despite these limitations, this study provides contributions to the literature 
through the use and development of direct longitudinal measures of ERM process 
maturity as well as identification of differences in reporting structures which may be 






 INFLUENCE OF RISK FACTOR DISCLOSURE ON DEBT AND EQUITY 
FINANCING 
 
Abstract: Prior disclosure related literature (Botosan 1997; Sengupta 1998; Botosan and 
Plumlee 2002; and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009) has noted benefits of reduced cost of 
debt and equity for companies with enhanced disclosure reporting. This study considers 
the specific association between the extent of risk factor disclosures in annual SEC filings 
(10-K) and the proxies for cost of debt and equity. Using a three year period (2006-2008) 
of panel data for a cross section of companies responding to a survey related to the ERM 
adoption survey used in the first two studies of this dissertation, I test whether a negative 
association exists between the number and level of risk disclosure factors per year with 
proxies for cost of debt (yearly change in S&P Long-term Credit Rating) and cost of 
equity (industry median adjusted average earnings to price ratio).  Results of the panel 
data regression provide limited support of the hypotheses, that a higher level of risk 
factor disclosure is associated with lower cost of debt and equity. While additional 
proxies exist for both cost of debt and cost of equity, this provides support to the benefits 
of enhanced risk disclosure. 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The recent economic meltdown has focused attention on the risky business practices 
used by organizations to attempt to enhance operational and market performance.  As the 
U.S. and other world economies have noticed such practices do not always result as 
planned.  Risk is one of the prime determinants in assessing the cost of debt and equity 
financing.  In establishing ERM initiatives, firms are encouraged to focus on the 
downside of risk, but the upside as well. The traditional approach to ERM initiatives was 
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to focus on the downside – the losses from currency or interest rate trades in financial 
markets, for instance, or financial losses that might be caused by a disruption in supply 
chain or cyber or terrorism attack that impairs a company‘s information technology.  
However, now firms are supposed to consider competitive opportunities and strategic 
advantages that might arise out of the efficient risk management (focusing on preventive 
measures that help a firm avoid potential future disasters. Organizations which are better 
able to manage and optimize risk throughout the organization by mitigating adverse 
events (downside risk) while taking advantage of opportunities (upside risk) are more 
likely to outperform organizations which are unable to adequately manage such risk.  
Lam (2001) indicates that firms implementing Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) as 
proxied for by the hiring of a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) are able to reduce losses and 
earnings volatility.  Affleck-Graves et al. (2002) have also found reduced losses and 
variability of earnings to be associated with reductions in organizations cost of debt 
(higher credit rating) and equity.   
Although the existence of ERM processes within banking and financial organizations 
has been used in Standard & Poor‘s and Moody‘s debt rating processes for some time, the 
companies have announced that they will begin to include factors related to ERM 
adoption in their procedures for rating other industries.  As a result it is expected that 
future debt ratings will include a direct measure of ERM maturity which would likely be 
associated with lower debt ratings for organizations with less robust ERM processes.  
While the consideration of ERM activities is not currently directly included in debt 
ratings, it is likely to be indirectly incorporated as a result of risk assessment and 
management disclosures as well as decreased volatility of firm financial and market 
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performance benefits as indicated by Lam (2001).  In addition to higher debt ratings 
(lower cost of debt), in the long run, the market is likely to respond favorably to higher 
and more consistent earnings per share (EPS) and lower earnings volatility through a 
reduction in the cost of equity to an organization.  
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) Enterprise Risk Management 
(ERM) Integrated Framework (COSO-ERM) serves as guidance to considerations in the 
effective management of both down side and upside risk.  This study uses two measures 
of risk disclosure (count of disclosed risk factors and count of key considerations of 
Enterprise Risk Management as noted by COSO and Desender (2007)) to evaluate the 
association with cost of debt and equity. 
The next section contains a review of prior literature related to ERM benefits as well 
as studies associated with the cost of debt and equity.  The development and formal 
identification of the research hypotheses is included in section three.  Research 
methodology and data are discussed in the forth section followed by the conclusions and 
contributions of the study.   
4.2 PRIOR RESEARCH 
Increased levels of disclosure provide creditors (including credit rating agencies) and 
investors with additional information to evaluate investment decisions while also 
decreasing the level of asymmetric information thereby reducing the risk of investment.  
Arthur Levitt (1998), former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) emphasized that disclosure was a component of high quality accounting standards 
which increase investor confidence resulting in lower cost of capital for firms.  Consistent 
with Levitt, prior research in the area of cost of debt and cost of equity financing has 
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frequently found that both creditors and investors reduce their potential required return 
rate as a result of this decreased information asymmetry and risk achieved through 
greater disclosure.  Healy and Palepu (2001) provide a review of disclosures literature 
and indicate that, disclosure is demanded by investors in order to make appropriate 
decisions, thereby reducing the cost of debt and equity. 
Cost of Debt 
Sengupta (1998) finds that a firms overall financial disclosure quality is inversely 
associated with its cost of debt.  Using the quality of accruals as a proxy for information 
risk, Francis et al. (2005) find that lower accrual quality is associated with higher cost of 
debt and equity.  Ahmed et al. (2002) find conservative accounting to be associated with 
lower cost of debt.  Considering that increased disclosure of risk provides greater 
consideration of potential loss, a greater level of risk disclosure may also proxy for a 
higher level of accounting conservatism.   
Cost of Equity 
While sensitive to the level of analyst following, Botosan (1997) finds an inverse 
relationship between the level of disclosure and the cost of equity capital after controlling 
for market beta and firm size.  Botosan and Plumlee (2002) find differential effects in the 
relationship of cost of equity based on whether the disclosure was included in the annual 
report (negative association between disclosure level and cost of equity) or disclosure in 
other publications (positive association between disclosure level and cost of equity).  
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) find that firms disclosing internal control deficiencies 
experience an initial increase in cost of equity as a result of greater information risk.  The 
increased cost of equity for such firms is found to decrease once identified control 
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deficiencies are remediated and an unqualified controls opinion is provided by the 
independent auditor (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009).  Francis et al. (2005) find that lower 
accrual quality increases the information risk of investors, resulting in higher cost of 
equity for the firm. 
4.3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Firms with more mature ERM processes are more likely to embed risk management 
processes throughout business processes.  Such an increased awareness of risk throughout 
the organization increases the likelihood of risk identification and implementation of 
appropriate procedures to manage risk.  Based on the identification of risk, management 
has the ability to determine whether to disclose the existence of such identified risk to 
creditors and shareholders.  The additional disclosure of risk provides two potential 
benefits to creditors and investors: identification of risk to the organization and a signal 
of the effectiveness of the firms risk management process.  As a result, consideration of 
risk is more likely to lead decreased risk of loan default and stock price volatility, 
resulting in a lower cost of debt and equity financing.  Consistent with prior research 
(Sengupta 1998; and Botosan 1997), I expect increased disclosure of risk factors to be 
associated with reduced risk and cost of capital.  This leads to the two hypotheses of this 
study stated in alternative form: 
Hypothesis 1 - Companies which disclose more risk factors experience higher 
credit ratings (lower cost of debt). 
 
Hypothesis 2 - Companies which implement more risk factors experience lower 








Cost of capital can be separated into two primary components (debt capital and equity 
capital) with certain benefits associated with the use of each in making to finance 
operations.  The following section discusses the methodology and measures for each.   
Cost of Debt 
I use firm credit ratings (S&P Long-Term Credit Rating) as a proxy for a firm‘s cost 
of debt to investigate whether firms providing greater disclosure of risk factors have a 
lower cost of debt. While Jiang (2008) used both credit ratings and initial bond yield 
spreads as proxies for cost of debt and Francis et al. (2005) uses an estimate interest rate 
for outstanding interest bearing long-term debt, this study focuses on the use of the firm 
credit rating as a proxy for cost of debts.
1
   
I use the following ordered logistic model and control variables, adapted from Jiang 
(2008), to include a risk disclosure measure (disclosed risk factors), to evaluate whether 
higher management disclosure of risk factors affects firm credit ratings: 
ΔRatingi,t+1 = f{PROFITi,t , EPSi,t , ∆CFOi,t , ∆StdROAi,t, ∆TIMESi,t , ∆StdReti,t,  
 ∆BMi,t ,    ∆Sizei,t , ∆LEVi,t , DISCRISKi,t}           (1) 
  
                                                             
1
 As a result of the potential differences in the cost of debt proxies, additional sensitivity tests 
will be conducted prior to journal submission using alternative measures of cost of debt including 
the initial bond yield spread used by Jiang (2008) and estimated cost of debt proxy following 




ΔRatingi,t+1 = Ratingi,t+1 - Ratingi,t, where Ratingi,t is a numeric value associated 
with firm i‘s Standard & Poor‘s Domestic Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating 
(senior debt rating) in year t.  S&P uses a three alpha-character rating to 
identify the firm‘s ability to repay interest and principal with AAA 
indicating the highest likelihood of repayment, and D indicating default.  
Debt ratings are transformed from alpha characters to numeric characters 
with a smaller number indicating greater likelihood of repayment and 
larger numbers indicating greatest likelihood of default (AAA = 1; D = 23; 
Table 2 of the appendix provides a complete listing of the ratings).  Based 
on this method, a negative change represents a ratings upgrade while a 
positive difference indicates a ratings downgrade; 
DISCRISKi,t – Two separate values of risk disclosure are used within the model 
to capture a measure of total risk disclosure and more specifically an ERM 
risk disclosure method.  Each measure was manually captured from the 
―Item 1a. Risk Factors‖ section of 10-K filings of companies responding 
to the survey.   
 DISCTOTALi,t – Count of the total number of risk factors disclosed by the 
company i‘s in year t‘s 10-K. 
 DISCERMi,t - Count of the total number of risk factors disclosed by the 
company ―i‖ in year ―t‘s‖ 10-K that are related to key terms of the 
dimensions and factors of ERM included in Desender (2007). The listing 
of dimensions and factors considered by Desender (2007) is included in 
Table 1 of the Appendix);  
 
with control variables defined as follows: 
 
PROFITi,t - takes on the value of 1 if the firms with basic EPS greater than 0 in 
year t, and 0 otherwise; 
EPSi,t  - Firms i‘s earnings per share before extraordinary items in year t scaled by 
its stock price at the end of year t-1; 
CFOi,t = Firm i‘s cash flows from continuing operations for year t scaled by total 
assets at the beginning of the year (t-1); 
StdROAi,t = Standard deviation of firm i‘s ROA calculated using five years of 
data from to t  to t-4.  ROA is computed as net income before 
extraordinary items scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t (ending 
of year t-1); 
TIMESi,t = Natural log of (1+ times interest earned ratio), where times interest 
earned ratio is firm i‘s operating income before depreciation and interest 
expense divided by interest expense for year t; 
StdReti,t - Standard deviation of firm i‘s daily stock returns during year t;  
BMi,t = Natural log of firm i‘s book value of equity divided by its market value of 
equity, each measured at the end of year t. 
Sizei,t = Natural log of firm i‘s total assets at the end of year t; 
LEVi,t = Firm i‘s long-term debt divided by total assets at the end of year t.  
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Each change variable (variables in the model preceded by a ∆ symbol) in the model is 
defined as the first difference of the above variables, following the example provide in 
the description of the Ratings variable. 
Cost of Equity 
Prior literature has identified multiple proxies of the cost of equity
2
. I follow the 
model used by Francis et al. (2005), the industry adjusted earnings-price ratio (inverse 
P/E ratio) as a proxy for the cost of equity. Thus, a higher (lower) earnings-price ratio 
(E/P ratio) is associated with a higher (lower) cost of equity capital.  While controlling 
for firm growth, leverage, market risk, and size, I use the following model to test whether 
increased disclosure risk factors as described above is associated with cost of equity 
capital: 
IndEPi,t = α0 + β1GROWTHi,t + β2LEVERAGEi,t + β3BETAi,t+ β4SIZEi,t+  
β5DISCRISKi,t + εit             (2) 
where: 
IndEPi,t  - The difference between firm i‘s earnings-price ratio and the firms 
industry median earnings-price ratio (higher earnings-price ratio indicates 
higher cost of equity capital); 
 
with control variables defined as follows: 
GROWTHi,t - Log of one plus the firm i‘s growth in book value of equity over the 
past 5 years (years t through t-4); 
LEVERAGEi,t - Firm i‘s ratio of interest bearing debt to total assets in year t; 
BETAi,t  - Firm i‘s systemic volatility compared to the stock market (measured on 
a 5 year rolling average basis in CRSP); 
SIZEi,t - Log of firm i‘s total assets in year t. 
 
  
                                                             
2
 Hail and Leuz (2006) summarize additional cost of equity models which include the Claus 
and Thomas (2001) model, the Gebhardt et al. (2001), Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005), and 
the Modified PEG ratio model (Easton, 2004). While access to I/B/E/S prevented calculation and 
use of these other proxies. The aforementioned models will be considered as proxy for cost of 




The initial sample for this study was limited to the 259, companies which responded 
to an on-line survey related to Enterprise Risk Management and Internal Audit Function 
characteristics.  Although the sample of this study is limited to companies that responded 
to the survey, all data used in this study was obtained from S&P Compustat, CRSP, and 
10-K filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.  Panel A and Panel B of 
Table 4.1 provide reconciliations of observations used in this study.  As a result of the use 
of the S&P Debt rating as a proxy for cost of debt, and the limited availability of S&P 
Long-Term Debt Ratings and other control variables, the cost of equity sample and cost 
of debt samples differ in size; descriptive statistics and correlation tables are presented 
separately within their respective sections.  Using a cross-sectional fixed-effects model, I 
test for an association between risk disclosures (DISCTOTAL and DISCERM) with 
measures of cost of debt and cost of equity.
3
 
Cost of Debt Models 
Following the model used by Jiang (2008), this study uses a one year debt rating 
change as a proxy for cost of debt.  Table 4.2 provides a summary of the descriptive 
statistics for the cost of debt sample which includes 383 firm year observations from 149 
companies.  The average total assets of companies in the survey is $15,959M of which 
over eighty-seven percent of companies in the sample had a profit during the three year 
period, 2006 through 2008.  In addition, the average number of risk factors disclosed in 
was 19.1 with an average of 6.7 disclosures being related to key terms used by Desender 
(2007) as a proxy for the adoption of ERM. Table 4.3 provides the correlation matrix for 
                                                             
3
 Likelihood ratio of period fixed-effects and Hausman tests of random effects models were 
both rejected.  A likelihood ratio test indicated significant cross-sectional fixed-effects. 
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the 383 observations of the study.  While a high positive correlation exist between the 
disclosure measures (DISCTOTAL and DISCERM), these two variables are not included 
concurrently included in the same model.  In addition, several of the independent 
variables are highly correlated (EPSt and PROFITt, (0.594) and ΔStdROAt and PROFITt   
(-0.409) and EPSt-0.469)) provides initial potential concerns regarding multi-collinarity 
within the model.   
 
TABLE 4.1 - Panel A - Ratings Change Sample Reconciliation 
Companies Responding to Survey  259   
*3 Observations per company 
 
777 
Observations eliminated as a result of lack of: 
 
  
Ratings Information (269)   
Earnings per Share Information (9)   
Cash Flows from Operating Activities (23)   
Times Interest Earned data (32)   
Subtotal - Missing Compustat Data (333)   
Daily Returns Data (CRSP) (31)   
Risk Factor Disclosures (SEC Filing Data) (7)   
Total Observations eliminated due to missing data  (371)   





TABLE 4.1 - Panel B - Industry Adjusted EPRatio Sample Reconciliation 
Companies Responding to Survey  259   
*3 Observations per company 
 
777 
Observations eliminated as a result of lack of: 
 
  
Earnings to Price Ratio (17)   
Leverage information (4)   
Growth (86)   
Subtotal - Missing Compustat Data (107)   
Market Returns to calculate Beta (CRSP) (11)   
Risk Factor Disclosures (SEC Filing Data) (23)   
Total Observations eliminated due to missing data  (141)   







TABLE 4.2 - Descriptive Statistics - S&P Credit Rating Change Model Variables 
(n=383) 
Variable  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Std. Dev. 
ΔRATINGt 0.042 0.000 -3.000 4.000 0.733 
PROFITt 0.875 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.332 
EPSt 0.038 0.058 -1.306 0.246 0.126 
ΔCFOt -0.003 0.000 -0.378 0.847 0.078 
ΔStdROAt 0.001 0.000 -0.167 0.109 0.022 
ΔTIMESt -0.037 0.003 -2.643 1.962 0.425 
ΔStdRETt 0.008 0.003 -0.017 0.068 0.013 
ΔLNB2Mt 0.199 0.111 -4.696 3.812 0.603 
ΔSIZEt 0.056 0.038 -1.234 1.449 0.222 
ΔLEVERAGEt 0.005 -0.002 -0.362 0.480 0.075 
DiscTotalt 19.120 18.000 1.000 69.000 9.201 





TABLE 4.3 – Correlation Matrix - S&P Credit Rating Change Model Variables (n=383) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) ΔRATINGt 1.000                       
(2) PROFITt -0.312 1.000                     
(3) EPSt -0.239 0.594 1.000                   
(4) ΔCFOt -0.048 0.111 0.048 1.000                 
(5) ΔStdROAt 0.278 -0.409 -0.469 -0.048 1.000               
(6) ChgTIMESt -0.286 0.289 0.232 0.042 -0.193 1.000             
(7) ΔStdRETt 0.235 -0.411 -0.362 -0.102 0.255 -0.095 1.000           
(8) ΔLNB2Mt 0.110 -0.170 -0.041 -0.061 0.011 -0.054 0.469 1.000         
(9) ΔSIZEt 0.004 0.220 0.227 0.069 -0.206 0.092 -0.182 0.129 1.000       
(10) ΔLEVERAGEt 0.175 -0.134 -0.107 -0.073 0.058 -0.278 0.101 -0.106 0.088 1.000     
(11) DiscTotalt -0.024 -0.130 -0.092 -0.018 -0.018 -0.072 0.211 0.168 0.092 -0.013 1.000   





Table 4.4 provides the results of five regression models with ΔRatingi,t+1 as the 
dependent variable.  The results indicate a consistently positive associations between the 
change in standard deviation of ROA and change in leverage and ratings changes.  In 
addition, the coefficients of PROFIT, change in TIMES, are statistically significant and 
negative.  The raw measure of disclosed ERM related risk factors is statistically 
significant and negative providing limited support for Hypothesis 1 for both the current 
year period and one year lagged period. 
As an additional test to control for potential outliers and to evaluate whether potential 
differences exists between different levels of disclosure, the disclosure variable measures 
(DISCTOTAL and DISCERM) are divided into a high, medium, and low reporting 
categorical dummy variables.  Table 4.4 (Panels A and B) provides the results of 
regressions including high (DISCTOTAL3 and DISCERM3) and low (DISCTOTAL1 
and DISCERM1) disclosure level measures into the base regression model.  The high/low 
total disclosure levels regression model results indicate that companies with a higher 
level of disclosures (DISCTOTAL3) is associated with lower cost of debt.  This result 
provides additional evidence that in support of the first hypothesis, that increased 
disclosure is associated with decreased cost of capital.   
Cost of Equity Models 
The cost of equity model used follows Francis et al. (2005) in using the industry 
median adjusted earning to price ratio as a proxy for cost of equity.  Table 4.5 provides 







TABLE 4.4 (Panel A) – Credit Rating Change Models Regression Results (Ordered Logit) 
ΔRatingi,t+1 = f{PROFITi,t , EPSi,t , ∆CFOi,t , ∆StdROAi,t, ∆TIMESi,t , ∆StdReti,t , ∆BMi,t , 
∆Sizei,t , ∆LEVi,t , DISCRISKi,t} 
PROFITt -0.501 -0.520 -0.511 -0.497 -0.501 
 
(0.081) (0.072) (0.079) (0.084) (0.082) 
EPSt -0.040 -0.084 -0.200 -0.074 -0.067 
 
(0.940) (0.874) (0.720) (0.884) (0.899) 
ΔCFOt 0.133 0.123 0.093 0.168 0.130 
 
(0.877) (0.885) (0.913) (0.844) (0.878) 
ΔStdROAt 9.963 9.556 9.094 9.823 9.782 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
ΔTIMESt -0.542 -0.557 -0.549 -0.576 -0.552 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
ΔStdRETt 6.810 8.609 9.031 8.741 7.374 
 
(0.279) (0.183) (0.168) (0.166) (0.247) 
ChgLNB2Mt 0.047 0.054 0.052 0.058 0.051 
 
(0.731) (0.692) (0.707) (0.666) (0.703) 
ΔSIZEt 0.495 0.555 0.579 0.494 0.500 
 
(0.167) (0.129) (0.122) (0.158) (0.159) 
ChgLEVERAGEt 1.867 1.738 1.650 1.814 1.831 
 




   
  
(0.150) 




   
(0.484) 




   
(0.089) 
  DiscERMt 
   
-0.065 
 
    
(0.045) 
 DiscERM1t 
    
0.077 
     
(0.615) 
DiscERM3t 
    
-0.038 
     
(0.806) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.099 0.102 0.107 0.105 0.100 
LR statistic 65.600 68.087 71.358 69.476 66.134 
Prob(LR statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 383 383 383 383 383 
Note: White Heteroskedastic Standard Errors used to calculate p- values in parentheses.  Significant 
coefficients and p-values of control variables noted in italics. Significant coefficients and p-values of for 










TABLE 4.4 (Panel B) – Credit Rating Change Models Regression Results (Ordered Logit) 
ΔRatingi,t+1 = f{PROFITi,t , EPSi,t , ∆CFOi,t , ∆StdROAi,t, ∆TIMESi,t , ∆StdReti,t , ∆BMi,t , 
∆Sizei,t , ∆LEVi,t , DISCRISKi,t} 
PROFITt -0.227 -0.241 -0.188 -0.178 -0.213 
 
(0.451) (0.425) (0.542) (0.541) (0.459) 
EPSt -0.171 -0.237 -0.216 -0.213 -0.181 
 
(0.769) (0.686) (0.703) (0.696) (0.745) 
ΔCFOt -0.403 -0.380 -0.310 -0.266 -0.278 
 
(0.647) (0.677) (0.748) (0.777) (0.769) 
ΔStdMROAt 8.573 7.972 8.274 8.234 8.140 
 
(0.015) (0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.025) 
ΔTIMESt -0.735 -0.765 -0.794 -0.798 -0.791 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔStdRETt 16.123 17.998 18.436 18.139 17.653 
 
(0.022) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) 
ΔLNB2Mt 0.094 0.111 0.109 0.089 0.099 
 
(0.586) (0.518) (0.535) (0.594) (0.559) 
ΔSIZEt 0.453 0.555 0.543 0.496 0.533 
 
(0.253) (0.174) (0.176) (0.217) (0.191) 
ΔLEVERAGEt 2.919 2.734 2.643 2.674 2.618 
 




   
  
(0.127) 




   
(0.809) 




   
(0.001) 
  DiscERMt-1 
   
-0.103 
 
    
(0.030) 
 DiscERM1t-1 
    
0.331 
     
(0.062) 
DiscERM3t-1 
    
-0.173 
     
(0.364) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.136 0.145 0.164 0.150 0.152 
LR statistic 63.317 67.302 76.042 69.509 70.429 
Prob(LR statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 257 257 257 257 257 
Note: White Heteroskedastic Standard Errors used to calculate p- values in parentheses.   
Significant coefficients and p-values of control variables noted in italics. Significant coefficients  
and p-values of for hypothesized variables noted in bold.  
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data regression model.  The average of the total company assets and leverage 
(LEVERAGE) for the 628 sample observations is $14,856M and 22.3 percent 
respectively.  Average unlevered Beta of observations is 0.691.  In addition, average 
number of risk factors disclosed in was 19.9 with an average of 6.6 disclosures being 
related to key terms used by Desender (2007) as a proxy for the adoption of ERM.  Table 
4.6 provides the correlation matrix for the 628 observations of the study.  Consistent with 
the correlation matrix for the cost of debt models, a high positive correlation exist 
between the disclosure measures (DISCTOTAL and DISCERM).  However, these two 




TABLE 4.5 –Descriptive Statistics – Cost of Equity Model (n=628) 
Industry Adjusted EPRatio Model Variables 
 
Mean Median Min.  Max. 
 Std. 
Dev. 
IndAdjEPRatiot -0.109 0.000 -7.493 0.478 0.578 
GROWTH 0.399 0.390 -5.180 3.299 0.822 
LEVERAGEt 0.218 0.189 0.000 1.050 0.180 
BETAtUnlev  0.691 0.589 -0.098 4.538 0.488 
SIZEt  8.259 8.133 4.593 14.085 1.488 
DiscTotalt 19.939 19.000 1.000 69.000 9.519 
DiscERMt 6.557 7.000 0.000 14.000 2.090 
DiscTotal1t 0.357 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.479 
DiscTotal2t 0.328 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.470 
DiscTotal3t 0.315 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.465 
DiscERM1t 0.346 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.476 
DiscERM2t 0.330 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.470 










TABLE 4.6 – Correlation Table – Industry Adjusted EPRatio Model (n=628) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) IndAdjEPRatiot 1.000 
            (2) GROWTH 0.248 1.000 
           
(3) LEVERAGEt -0.092 -0.205 1.000 
          
(4) BETAtUnlev  -0.059 0.062 -0.232 1.000 
         
(5) SIZEt  0.073 0.054 0.058 -0.354 1.000 
        
(6) DiscTotalt -0.073 0.172 0.003 0.244 -0.088 1.000 
       
(7) DiscERMt -0.084 0.006 0.095 0.065 0.169 0.518 1.000 
      
(8) DiscTotal1t 0.091 -0.055 -0.029 -0.192 0.166 -0.687 -0.364 1.000 
     
(9) DiscTotal2t -0.022 -0.081 0.011 0.037 -0.167 -0.065 -0.026 -0.520 1.000 
    
(10) DiscTotal3t -0.071 0.138 0.018 0.161 -0.003 0.775 0.401 -0.505 -0.474 1.000 
   
(11) DiscERM1t 0.117 -0.001 -0.104 -0.091 -0.069 -0.442 -0.763 0.424 -0.108 -0.327 1.000 
  
(12) DiscERM2t -0.086 -0.014 0.025 0.075 -0.082 0.017 0.009 -0.161 0.232 -0.068 -0.510 1.000 
 




Table 4.7 provides the results of five cost of equity regression models.  The results 
indicate a consistently significant positive association between the growth (GROWTH), 
unlevered Beta (BETAUnlev) with the median industry adjusted earnings to price ratio.  
In addition, a negative association is also noted between the natural log of total assets and 
the median industry adjusted earnings to price ratio.  With the exception of the significant 
and positive coefficient on the low level of ERM disclosure variable (DiscERM1), the 
disclosure variables are not significant.  The positive and significant value of the 
coefficient is consistent with Hypothesis 2, that a lower level of risk disclosure is 








TABLE 4.7 – IndAdjEPRatio Regression Results  
IndEPRatioi,t = α0 + β1GROWTHi,t + β2LEVERAGEi,t + β3BETAi,t+ β4SIZEi,t+ 
β5DISCRISKi,t + εit 
GROWTH 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.016 
 
(0.055) (0.051) (0.054) (0.057) (0.059) 
LEVERAG
Et 
0.115 0.114 0.116 0.12 0.123 
 
(0.148) (0.150) (0.144) (0.139) (0.127) 
BetatUnlev
ered 
0.034 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.035 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
SIZEt -0.048 -0.049 -0.047 -0.048 -0.048 
 
(0.121) (0.113) (0.125) (0.117) (0.117) 
FY2008 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.01 0.011 
 
(0.064) (0.149) (0.060) (0.042) (0.025) 
FY2006 -0.010 -0.010 -0.01 -0.011 -0.011 
 




   
  
(0.424) 




   
(0.491) 




   
(0.999) 
  DiscERMt 
   
-0.002 
 
    
(0.257) 
 DiscERM1t 
    
0.014 
     
(0.027) 
DiscERM3t 
    
0.002 
     
(0.858) 
Constant 0.354 0.351 0.348 0.373 0.346 
 
(0.140) (0.144) (0.148) (0.130) (0.145) 
Observatio
ns 
520 520 520 520 520 
Cross 
Sections 
210 210 210 210 210 
R-squared 0.700 0.701 0.701 0.702 0.705 
Adj. R^2 0.487 0.487 0.484 0.487 0.491 
F-stat 3.230 2.836 2.469 2.776 2.646 
Note: White Heteroskedastic Standard Errors used to calculate p- values in parentheses.   
Significant coefficients and p-values of control variables noted in italics. Significant  




4.6 CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
This study hypothesizes an inverse relationship between the level of risk disclosure 
and cost of debt and cost of equity.  The results provide limited evidence to support the 
hypothesized negative association between the level of risk disclosure and cost of debt, 
thereby providing support that additional disclosure of risk provides debt and equity 
financing benefits in the form of lower cost based on the proxies utilized in the study.   
Consistent with the second hypothesis, the results of the test of association between 
the total number of disclosed risk factors and the measure of cost of equity is negative 
and significant.  These results provide limited evidence that equity investors not only 
value transparency and disclosure of risk for their investments, but may also consider 
increased disclosure of risk as a signal of not only risk identification, but also enhanced 
management of risk.   
Although the results of the study are potentially limited based on due to a small 
sample size which choose to respond to the survey.  Combined, these results suggest that 








The majority of prior literature related to ERM has focused on the characteristics of 
organizations which have adopted ERM.  Although potential factors associated with 
ERM adoption is the focus of the first study of this dissertation, I add to the existing 
literature by extending the study of ERM adoption by evaluating whether potential 
operational and market performance benefits exist for firms which have implemented 
ERM and the association between risk factor disclosure and cost of capital.  This study 
contributes to ERM research in several ways, the first of which is achieved by using a 
survey to obtain a more direct measure of ERM adoption as opposed to the relying on the 
appointment of a Chief Risk Officer as a noisy proxy for ERM adoption. Secondly, this 
dissertation extends existing literature by empirically testing for the existence of 
operating and market performance benefits of ERM process maturity. Finally, the 
collection, classification, and summarization of disclosed risk factors and its association 
with cost of capital provides not only a method for measuring risk disclosure but also 
extends disclosure literature.  
Consistent with the hypotheses of the first paper, this study provides support that 
audit committee financial expertise and meeting frequency and Internal Audit Function 
reporting independence and whether an organizations Internal Audit Function has been 
evaluated externally and/or internally are associated with ERM adoption and the level 
ERM process maturity. Although the results of the second study do not provide consistent 
and positive significant coefficients for the association between ERM maturity and 
operational and market performance, several potential considerations for the lack of 
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significant results are discussed below. Consistent with the hypotheses stated in the third 
paper, the results of a regression of the disclosure panel data set provide support that 
greater risk factor disclosure and levels of disclosure are associated with lower cost of 
debt and equity. 
The use of a direct measure of assessed ERM adoption and maturity is one of the 
contributions of this dissertation; this improvement does not come without limitations.  
Specifically, the sample size is limited to 249 companies or fewer depending on data 
requirements of the regression models. The use of panel data helps to minimize this 
concern by expanding the number of observations by as many as three annual 
observations per company. Although not specifically identified by simple review of 
correlation tables, regression results indicate that the issues of multi-colliniarity of 
independent variables within the model indicate additional concerns regarding the 
generalizeability of lack of support for the hypotheses evaluated in the performance 
benefit study. Despite these limitations, as previously indicated, this study has provided 
several contributions to the accounting literature. 
Despite the noted limitations of this study, the ability to increase the sample size and 
period of time series observations could help further extend the literature related to ERM. 
In addition, recent disclosure requirements related to the role and activities of the 
organizations board for risk management oversight activities and the disclosure of the 
compensation committee evaluation of compensation risk evaluation process provides an 
area with great potential.  Finally, consideration of other potential benefits as well as 
organizational or industry specific risk benefits provide opportunities not only to consider 
the benefits, but also the ability to identify possible reasons for lack of benefits within 
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certain industry sectors. These considerations should provide considerable opportunities 
for not only identifying ERM benefits, but also the opportunity to enhance the framework 
and study what makes one ERM process better than another. Finally, the using a field 
study to develop a clear understanding of ERM processes provide another area to expand 
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APPENDIX 1 – SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
Survey Questionnaire Cover Letter: 
 
RE: Dissertation Study Survey  
The University of Memphis 
Fogelman College of Business Administration & Economics 
  
In fulfillment of the requirements of my doctorate dissertation studies at The University 
of Memphis, I am conducting a brief survey to obtain data regarding characteristics of 
your Internal Audit Function (IAF) and the extent of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 
processes within organizations.  Your responses and additional feedback is critical to this 
dissertation study, therefore I ask you to please take a few minutes to complete the on-
line survey at the following link. While the identity of your organization is necessary to 
gather additional organizational and financial data which are publicly available, please 
rest assured that your responses will be held in strict confidence, and neither the company 
nor individual respondents will be specifically publicly identified for the purpose of this 
study.   
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=FJlceOfkxZELbYChx8pP5Q_3d_3d 
Should you have any questions or concerns regarding the survey, please feel free to 
contact me at jssoilea@memphis.edu or by phone at (901)552-6955, or my Dissertation 
Chairperson at The University of Memphis, Dr. Carolyn Callahan, at 
cmcllhan@memphis.edu or by phone at (901)678-4569. 
  




Jared S. Soileau, CIA, CPA, CISA, CCSA 
Ph.D. Student – School of Accountancy 





Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is a very broad process which organizations for 
various different reasons may or may not choose to implement with no two 
implementations being identical. While Internal Audit Functions (IAFs) may or may not 
be directly involved in the implementation of ERM, it is likely that IAF management 
would be knowledgeable of ERM implementation, the structure of ERM reporting 
function, and ERM risk considerations. Therefore I am hopeful that you will assist me in 
my dissertation study of factors contributing to ERM adoption and potential 
organizational benefits which may potentially result from ERM adoption. While 
identification of your organization is necessary to match your responses to financial 
reporting and market data, your responses will be kept in strict confidence and will only 
be presented and discussed in aggregate. Your time in completing the following survey is 
greatly appreciated. 
 
Organization Name: ___________________________  
 
How would you classify your organization? 
___ Publically Traded   ___ Privately Held   ___ Not-for-profit    
___ Government Agency   ___ Other 
 
INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION CHARACTERISTICS 
 
How many full-time equivalents (FTEs) does your Internal Audit Function (IAF) 
employ? ___ 
 
Approximately what percentage of IAF staff members hold the following certifications 
(please do not enter a "%"): 
      % CIA       % CISA 
      % CPA       % Other (please specify) ______________________ 
      % At least one certification (CPA, CIA, CISA, etc.)  
 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements regarding your 
organizations internal audit function(IAF): 
(1= strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neutral; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree) 
Statement 
Level of Agreement  
(circle one number) 
Internal Audit Reports to the CEO  1     2     3     4     5 
Internal Audit Reports to the CFO 1     2     3     4     5 
Internal Audit Reports to the Audit Committee 1     2     3     4     5 
The CFO has authority to terminate the Chief Audit 
Executive(CAE) 
1     2     3     4     5 
The CEO has authority to terminate the CAE 1     2     3     4     5 




Survey Questionnaire (continued) 
 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements regarding your 
organizations internal audit function(IAF): 
(1= strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neutral; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree) 
Statement 
Level of Agreement  
(circle one number) 
The Audit Committee authorizes/approves the IAF Budget  1     2     3     4     5 
The CFO authorizes/approves the IAF Budget 1     2     3     4     5 
The CEO authorizes/approves the IAF Budget 1     2     3     4     5 
The Audit Committee reviews and approves the IAF‘s annual risk 
assessment plan 
1     2     3     4     5 
The CEO reviews and approves the IAF‘s annual risk assessment 
plan 
1     2     3     4     5 
The CFO reviews and approves the IAF‘s annual risk assessment 
plan 
1     2     3     4     5 
 
How frequently do the following attend audit committee meetings? 
(1= never; 2 = infrequently; 3 = frequently; 4 = always) 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO)  1      2      3     4 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 1      2      3     4 
Chief Audit Executive(CAE) 1      2      3     4 
Chairman of the Board 1      2      3     4 
 
How much is the annual budget of the internal audit function? (please enter a whole 
number without any formatting decimals or commas) $____________ 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL Risk & RISK ASSESSMENT CHARACTERISTICS 
 
How would you rate the overall level of inherent risk at your organization? 
___ High ___ Moderate  ___ Low  ___ Unknown 
 
How would you rate the overall level of residual risk at your organization? 
___ High ___ Moderate  ___ Low  ___ Unknown 
 
How frequently does Internal Audit conduct a Risk Assessment of the Audit Universe at 
your organization? 
___ Monthly ___  Quarterly ___ Semi-Annually  
___ Annually ___ Do Not Conduct Risk Assessment 
 
What type of Risk Assessment do you conduct at your organization? 
___ Qualitative ___ 
Hybrid (combination qualitative and 
Quantitative) 






Survey Questionnaire (continued) 
 
What are the key components (classification categories) of your organizations Internal 
Audit risk assessment and weighting of each (High, Medium, Low)? 
    Not Considered Low   Medium High 
Management Change             ____   ___     ___  ___ 
Technology Change             ____   ___     ___  ___ 
Process Change             ____   ___     ___  ___ 
Competition              ____   ___     ___  ___ 
Market Growth/Decline            ____   ___     ___  ___ 
Geographical              ____   ___     ___  ___ 
Unit Revenue              ____   ___     ___  ___ 
Unit Costs              ____   ___     ___  ___ 
Budget Variances             ____   ___     ___  ___ 
Prior Audit Opinion             ____   ___     ___  ___ 
Time Since Last Audit             ____   ___     ___  ___ 
Other 1: ______________           ____   ___     ___  ___ 
Other 2: ______________           ____   ___     ___  ___ 
Other 3: ______________           ____   ___     ___  ___ 
Other 4: ______________           ____   ___     ___  ___ 
 
What is the basis of your organizations Audit Plan? (please check one) 
___ Risk Based ___ 
Hybrid (combination risk and rotational 
coverage) 
___ Rotational Audit Coverage ___ 
Other (please specify) 
____________________ 
 
Approximately what percentage of the audit time budget is spent conducting the 
following project types? 
 
      % Financial       % Consulting 
      % Operational       % Financial Audit Support 
      % Systems       % ERM Assessment 
      % 
Other (please specify) 
__________________________________ 
 
Has a Quality Assurance Review (QAR) of the Internal Audit Function (IAF) been 
conducted?  If so, please indicate the year of the last review, frequency of reviews and the 




Frequency Conducted by 
Internal     









Has your organization implemented ERM?   
___No;    ___ Informally;   ___Formally;   ___ Other: ___________________ 
 
Using the following rating scale, please rate the maturity your organizations ERM 
Processes (strategic, operational, reporting, compliance, overall) for the given year (2008, 
2007, 2006):  
0 - Non-existent – Management processes are not applied at all 
1 - Initial/Adhoc – Processes are ad hoc and disorganized 
2 - Repeatable but Intuitive – Processes follow a regular pattern 
3 - Defined Process – Processes are documented and communicated 
4 - Managed and Measureable – Processes are monitored and measured 
5 - Optimized – Good processes are followed and automated 
 
 2008 2007 2006 
Strategic    
Operational    
Reporting    
Compliance    
Overall    
 
Who is the sponsor of the ERM process? (Check all that apply) 
___ Chief Executive Officer  
       (CEO) 
___ Chief Financial Officer 
        (CFO) 
___ Chief Audit Executive  
       (CAE) 
 
___ Board of Directors 
 




Who is the leader of the ERM Process?  
___ Chief Risk Officer  
       (CRO) 
___ Chief Financial Officer 
        (CFO) 
___ ERM Committee 
___ Chief Audit Executive  
       (CAE) 
___ Chief Executive Officer  









Survey Questionnaire (continued) 
 
If responsibility lies within an ERM committee; Indicate each business function 




___ Internal Audit ___ Operations 
___ Information Technology 
 
___ Legal  
 
___ Other _________________________ 
 
If responsibility lies within an ERM committee; please identify the business function of 
those who chair the committee:  __________________________________ 
 
How much is the annual budget for organization-wide ERM activities? 
$__________________ 
 
Approximately how many FTE‘s are designated to the ERM function? _______ FTE‘s 
 
CHIEF RISK OFFICER (CRO) CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Does your organization have a Chief Risk Officer (CRO)? 
___No CRO;   ____ Informal CRO;    ___ Formally Appointed CRO 
 
Please specify any additional role (title) the CRO (formal or informal) fulfills at the 
organization:  ____________________________________  
 
If your organization has a formal or informal CRO, approximately when (MM/YYYY) 
was this role filled?  ___________________________________ 
 
Who (title) appointed the CRO? _______________________________________  
 
Who does the CRO report to?  
Functionally (title)      ________________________________________ 
 
Administratively (title) _______________________________________ 
 









Please indicate if there was any ambiguity with the questions, if you have any hesitation 
in providing responses to any questions, or any other feedback which you may have. 
 
Thank you for your participation in this study. If you wish to receive a copy of the results 
of this survey, please provide the following: 
 
Name:  _______________________________ 
 
Title:   _______________________________ 
 
email address: _______________________________ 
 
If you are willing to be contacted for any follow-up discussions to provide possible 
insight regarding the aggregated results of the study, please also provide your: 
 




APPENDIX 2 – FACTOR ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 
Factor analysis of the twelve items (six Audit Committee Effectiveness Characteristics 
and six Internal Audit function Effectiveness Characteristics) resulted in 5 factors with 
Eigenvalues great than one which explained a cumulative total of 59.844 percent of the 
variance.  In addition, three of the items cross-loaded on two factors with a loading 
greater than ―0.3‖.   
 
Table A2.1 Principal Component Analysis – Varimax Rotation 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
lnIAFTE 0.877         
lnIAFBud 0.730         
IAFQAR 0.669         
ACMem 0.584 -0.398       
%ACFE   0.679       
ACMeet   0.639     0.375 
ACRskAsmtScr   -0.423 0.649     
IAFRptIndp     0.826     
ACMTCEOScr       0.749   
COBMemAC       -0.692   
%IAFCert         0.583 





APPENDIX Table A3.1: Disclosure Checklist 
Dimensions and Factors of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) based on terms 
adapted from Desender (2007) 
 Key Term (Desender 2007) Search Text String 
Environmental *environmental* 
Ethics *ethic* 
Foreign Exchange Rate *foreign*exchange*rate* or  
*currency*exchange* 
Health & Safety Regulation *health*regulation* or  
*safety*regulation* 
Hotline *hot*line* 
Information Systems/Technology *information system* or *information 
technology* 
Interest Rate *interest rate* 
Internal Audit *internal audit* 
Liquidity *liquidity* 
Physical Controls *physical*control* 
Privacy *data*priva* or *priva*data* or 
*information*privacy* or 
*privacy*information* or *privacy*data* or 
*confidentiality* 
Segregation/Separation of Duties *segregation*dut* or *separation*duties* or 
*segregation*responsibilit* or *separation* 
responsibilit" 
Cost of Capital *cost of capital* or *credit rat* 




Industry Code *industry*code* 
Corporate Governance *governance* 
Data Management *data*management* 
Customer Data/Employee Data *customer*data* or *employee*data* 
Industry Competition *competition* 





Appendix Table A3.2 – S&P Credit Rating Translation Table 
 



















Note: Consistent with Jiang (2008), S&P credit rating for lower categories (higher credit 
risk firms) were grouped together in the ―CCC+‖ Credit Rating.  
 
 
